The Commercial Paper Market and the
Securities Acts
Although commercial paper currently provides both a major source
of financing for a diverse group of issuers and a significant investment
instrument for an increasingly widespread portion of the public, it has
been traditionally excluded from the full coverage of the federal securities acts. Developments in commercial paper over the last forty
years have given rise to a market strikingly different from that which
existed at the time these securities regulations were drafted.1 Prompted
by a recent swift expansion in the volume and uses of commercial
paper, along with the exposure of serious weaknesses in the commercial
paper market, 2 this comment undertakes a reappraisal of the relationship
between commercial paper and the regulatory pattern of the securities
acts.
The first section of this comment will examine the scope and opera1 For historical accounts of the commercial paper market, see N. BAXTER, THE CommERCIAL PAPER M AxRK (2d ed. 1966); R. FOULKE, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKEr (1931);
A.O. GREEF, THE COMMERCIAL PAPER HOUSE IN THE UNITED STATES (1938); R. SELDEN,
TREns AND CYCLES IN THE COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
OCCASIONAL PAPER 85 (1963); Steiner, The Commercial Paper Business, 1921
FED. RES. BULL. 920.
2 Commercial paper had been an important source of short-term business funds in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but its importance then began to decline.
Johnston, Rebirth of Commercial Paper, 1968 MONTHLY REv. FED. REs. BANK SAN
FRANCISCO 137; see N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 4-23. In 1933, the commercial paper market
averaged only about $139 million in commercial paper outstanding, id. at 17, table I-1,
RESEARCH,

while total corporate debt stood at $76.9 billion, 1972
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r

268, table B-62. Even with its renewed growth after World War II, the 1920 peak in
outstandings of approximately $1 billion, N. BAxTER, supra note 1, at 17, table I-I, was
not regained until 1951, 1955 FED. REs. BULL. 42. Corporate debt, however, had risen
during that period from $57.7 billion, U.S. DEP'T OF COzMERCE, STATISTICAL HISTORY OF
THE UNrED STATES 644, ser. X 428 (1960), to $162.5 billion, 1972 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 268, table B-62. As recently as 1960, commercial paper outstanding totaled only
$4.5 billion, 1964 FED. RES. BULL. 72, in a corporate credit market of $302.8 billion, 1972
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 268, table B-62. During the 1960s and early 1970,
commercial paper attained renewed significance as a credit instrument, when it was increasingly used by borrowers as a supplement to sometimes scarce, and often costly, bank
credit. At the market's peak in May, 1970, commercial paper outstanding amounted to
$39.6 billion, FED. RES. BULL., July, 1970, at A 37, while corporate debt for 1970 was
$774.1 billion, 1972 ECONOMIC REPORT OF PE PsIDENT 268, table B-62. As of February,
1972, the volume of outstandings was $32.25 billion, FED. REs. BULL., Apr., 1972, at A 33.
The weaknesses in the commercial paper market that have concurrently developed are
discussed in the text at notes 75-127 infra.

Commercial Paper and Securities Acts

don of the contemporary market in commercial paper, with special
attention to its evolution during this century. The second and third
sections will focus on the treatment of commercial paper under the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 respectively, and will evaluate this regulatory scheme in light of current
market realities. 4 The thesis presented is that the commercial paper
presently in use is a significantly different instrument from the paper
that existed when the securities laws were enacted and that the federal
regulatory treatment of commercial paper should therefore be reconsidered. 5
I. Tm COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET
Commercial paper consists of unsecured, short-term promissory notes
issued by sales and personal finance companies; by manufacturing,
transportation, trade, and utility companies; and by the affiliates and
subsidiaries of commercial banks.0 The notes are payable to the bearer
3 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970).
4 There has been no analysis in the literature of this relationship. In the legal writing
on securities regulation, commercial paper has never been specifically treated in depth; in
the discussions of commercial paper in business journals, it has always been assumed that
such paper is excluded from the full coverage of the securities acts. See, e.g., Armour,
Out of the Storm Cellar, B~amoN's, June 21, 1971, at 3; Cloos, A Larger Role for Commercial Paper, J. COM. BANK LENDiNG, Apr., 1969, at 2, 13; Trends in Commercial Paper,
SuRvEY CURRENT Bus., Sept., 1970, at 4.
s Much of the information on the commercial paper market set forth in this comment
is based on interviews conducted between August, 1971, and February, 1972 with representatives of institutions participating in all phases of the market. Many interviewees
requested total anonymity; those who did not include the following: (1) commercial paper
dealers: A. G. Becker & Co. (New York); First Boston Corporation (New York); Goldman,
Sachs & Co. (Chicago); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (New York); (2) direct
issuers of commercial paper: Irving Trust Company (New York) (which issues paper
through its holding company, Charter New York Corporation); Walter Heller & Company
(Chicago); (3) regulatory bodies: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago; Federal Reserve Bank
of New York; Securities and Exchange Commission (Washington, D.C.); (4) law firms:
Chapman & Cutler (Chicago); Ettelson, O'Hagan, Ehrlich & Frankel (Chicago); Pollack &
Singer (New York). Information received during interviews is cited to this footnote
generally because in most cases the interviewees requested total or partial anonymity.
6 Until the late nineteenth century, commercial paper was comprised largely of trade
notes received by manufacturers, wholesalers, or jobbers in payment for merchandise.
R. SErmEN, supra note 1, at 1. By 1931, commercial paper denoted short-term (maturity
from two to nine months) negotiable instruments. It consisted of the following types of
instruments in the estimated proportions: (1) unsecured, single-name promissory notes
of commercial and industrial concerns (fifty percent); (2) promissory notes of commercial
and industrial firms bearing the indorsement or guarantee of the officers or of other
principal parties at interest (thirty percent); and (3) obligations of finance companies,
cotton dealers, cattle loan companies, grain elevators, and warehouse companies, which
were represented by collateral trust notes, and two-name paper-that is, notes receivable
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on a stated maturity date. Maturities range from one day to nine
months, but most paper carries an original maturity between thirty
and ninety days. When the paper becomes due, it is generally rolled
over-that is, reissued-to the same or a different investor at the
7
market rate at the time of maturity.
Commercial paper notes are of two types, discount notes without interest and nondiscount notes with interest. Their face denominations

range from approximately $2,500 to $1 million or more. Placement of
commercial paper is made either directly with the investor by the issuer

(direct paper) or indirectly through a dealer who in most cases acts as
principal (dealer paper). Because the notes are unsecured, the issuers
have generally consisted of large, well-known companies whose financial positions have been assumed to be above question. Largely because
of the financial reputation of these issuers, commercial paper has
been considered relatively riskless, bearing interest rates just above those
on Treasury bills and bankers' acceptances. 8 Funds received from the
issuance of commercial paper have traditionally been used to finance
current operational business expenditures of a well-defined seasonal or
periodic nature. The underlying theory is that during the short
period from the date of the paper's issuance to its maturity, the borrower
will complete a cycle in which the cash obtained at the beginning of the
transaction is transformed into commodities through the process of
manufacture and sale and then converted back into cash at the end of
the transaction through the collection of the proceeds of the sale. In
a successful cycle, the completion of the operation that gave rise to
the loan provides the funds for retiring the paper, thus rendering it
self-liquidating. 9
and trade acceptances bearing the indorsement of the seller (twenty percent). R. FoutE,
supra note 1, at 3, 7; see N. BAXTEP, supra note 1, at 2-7. Single-name paper, or straight
paper, represents those notes that are the obligations of one party only-that is, the maker.
Although two or more names may appear on a note either as makers or endorsers, it is
still considered single-name paper if the names represent identical interests. F.L. GARCIA,
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND FINANCE 687 (6th ed. 1962). Two-name paper includes those

notes and trade acceptances that have two signatures, each representing separate interests
responsible for payment. R. FouLKE, supra note 1, at 7; F.L. GARCIA, supra at 748; see
C. PHILLIPS, BANK CsEDrr 262-63 (1926). A collateral trust note is a note secured by
receivables assigned to a trustee. N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 9 n.13.
7 Address by John F. McGillicuddy, President, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company,
Annual Finance Conference of the American Management Association, May 19, 1971, at 18
(copy on file at The University of Chicago Lawn Review); Interviews, supra note 5.
8 Armour, supra note 4, at 6. For March, 1972, the rate on prime commercial paper
with maturity from four to six months was 4.17 percent, while the rate on prime bankers'
acceptances of ninety days was 3.95 percent, and the market yield on three-month Treasury
bills was 3.72 percent. FED. Rxs. BULL., Apr., 1972, at A 35.
9 C. WHITrLESEY, MONEY AND BANKING 119 (1954); Steiner, supra note 1, at 924. See also
text at notes 181-92 infra.

1972]

Commercial Paper and Securities Acts

A. The Issuers: Direct Paper and Dealer Paper
Commercial paper is issued primarily to reduce borrowing costs; it
serves as a relatively low-cost alternative to bank loans10 and as a flexible
financial instrument that can be sold with little difficulty in the amounts
and maturities required. In addition, by having its notes offered, the corporation receives exposure to the financial community, which is an important benefit in securing further financing.1 1 The significant drawback
for the issuer is that commercial paper, unlike bank loans, cannot be
paid before maturity at the option of the borrower.1
1. Direct Paper.Direct placement-that is, the sale of notes by the
issuer without a dealer's assistance-was initiated in 1920 by a salesfinance company, General Motors Acceptance Corporation. It remained the only direct issuer until two other finance companies
entered the direct placement market in 1934.13 Beginning in the middle
and late 1930s, the use of directly placed paper expanded rapidly, both
absolutely and as a percentage of commercial paper outstanding. By
1939, directly placed paper constituted 52.1 percent of outstandings.' 4
After World War II, increasingly large demands for consumer credit
led to a rapid growth in the need for short-term funds by finance companies, which hold substantial consumer credit receivables. 15 Commercial paper became most important not as a seasonal bank loan
supplement issued by industrial concerns through dealers, but instead
as a relatively inexpensive method for finance companies to obtain funds
through direct placement.16 Then, in the late 1960s, a new dimension
was added to the market when banks began to issue direct paper through
subsidiaries and affiliates in an attempt to overcome the loss of funds
caused by rate ceilings on large certificates of deposit.1 By the middle
10 From the beginning of 1964 until June, 1971, the percent savings differential on
commercial paper as compared with the bank prime rate has been approximately 0.93
percent. See THE Fmsr BoSToN CoRPoRA'noN, COmERCL1 PAPER (1971) (copy on file at
The University of Chicago Law Review).
11 See N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 11.
12 Cloos, supra note 4, at 6. For treatments of the advantages and disadvantages of commercial paper for both the issuer and the investor, see N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 28-55;
Cloos, supra note 4, at 4-8; Johnston, Commercial Paper: 1970, 1971 MONTHLY RV. FED.
Rs. BANK SAN FRANctsco 57, 58-60.
13 These two finance companies were Commercial Credit Company and Commercial
Investment Trust Financial Corporation. N. BAXrER, supra note 1, at 16. The next company to issue commercial paper directly was General Electric Credit Corporation, in 1952.
R. SLEN, supra note 1, at 15.
14 N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 19-20, table 1-2.
15 Id. at 21, 23; R. S.Lau,, supra note 1, at 84.
10 See N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 15-27; R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 14-17, 19, 31-43.
17 If banks issue commercial paper directly, the funds obtained are treated as deposits
and are made subject to the Federal Reserve System's reserve requirements and interest
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of 1970, the twenty-nine nonbank direct issuers' 8 and the more than
forty banks in the direct placement market 19 accounted for approximately sixty-five percent of the total volume of commercial paper out20
standing.
Direct issuers borrow continuously in the commercial paper market in
order to obtain a regular flow of funds. For the investor, direct paper
is more flexible than dealer paper because direct issuers will place paper
in smaller denominations and shorter maturities, tailored to the needs
of the investor.21 Although denominations can range as low as $1,000,
purchases in amounts below $25,000 are not common.22 To justify the
sizable initial expenditure necessary for the direct placement of paper,
it is estimated that the issuing corporation must continuously have
outstandings in excess of $200 million.23 In practice, only the larger
finance companies 24 and the affiliates and subsidiaries of the larger
commercial banks26 have both the operational size to utilize the
substantial amounts of funds generated on a continual basis and the
reputation needed to justify the credit standing essential for investors'
acceptance. 26 Since mid-1970, the importance of commercial paper for
rate ceilings under Regulations D and Q. Commercial paper issued by bank affiliates,
however, was free from rate ceilings and reserve requirements until September, 1970.
Commercial banks borrow in the commercial paper market through subsidiaries and
affiliates such as holding companies. The affiliates then channel the proceeds to their
associated banks through purchases of loans from bank portfolios. Schadrack & Breimyer,
Recent Developments in the Commercial PaperMarket, 52 MoNTMY REv. FED. Rrs. BANK
N.Y. 280, 286-88 (1970).
18 Johnston, supra note 12, at 60.
19 Amour, Beautiful Balloon?, BARMON's, May 18, 1970, at 11, 20.
20 See FED. Rrs. BuLL., July, 1971, at A 33.
21 Id. at 281; R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 42. Another way in which direct issuers tailor
their paper to the needs of the investor is the "master note agreement." Under this type
of agreement, some finance companies have standing arrangements with trust departments
of banks to sell paper in blocks for allocation among individual trust accounts. In effect,
these are 1-day obligations that are constantly renewed with adjustments of amounts
outstanding and rates of interest, most commonly the posted rate on 180-day paper. The
banks assign various trust funds a portion of the total amount for a certain period, thus
keeping relatively small funds fully invested. Cloos, supra note 4, at 7; Johnston, supra
note 12, at 59.
22 Interviews, supra note 5; see Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 281.
23 Johnston, supra note 12, at 60. Previous estimates had been $100 million, Cloos,
supra note 4, at 10, and $50 million, Johnston, supra note 2, at 140. The mean amount
of outstandings of direct issuers was well over $200 million at the end of 1961, in comparison with a $156.4 million average of dealer paper per dealer. R. SELDEN, supra note 1,
at 42.
24 Johnston, supra note 12, at 60; McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 2.
28 Johnston, supra note 12, at 60-61.
26 In the third quarter of 1970, 80.8 percent of direct paper was issued by finance companies. The remaining 19.2 percent was issued by bank affiliates. Schadrack & Breimyer,
supra note 17, at 282, table I.
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banks has rapidly declined,2 7 while directly placed finance company
paper now accounts for approximately fifty-five percent of outstandings
28
in the commercial paper market.
2. Dealer Paper. The unique feature of the commercial paper
market boom in the late 1960s and early 1970 was the extremely
rapid growth of paper issued through dealers.2 9 Dealer paper is offered
through a small number of dealers, with six investment banking firms
handling most of the issues.30 It is usually sold in denominations of
one hundred thousand dollars or more, with only a few dealers selling
27 At the end of July, 1970, bank-related commercial paper had reached its peak, with
outstandings amounting to $7.82 billion, of which $6.83 billion was placed directly and
$0.99 billion was placed through dealers. See FED. REs. BULL., July, 1971, at A 33. As of
February, 1972, it had declined to $2.15 billion, with $1.62 billion placed directly and $0.53
billion placed through dealers. See FED. Ras. BuLL., Apr., 1972, at A 33. The sharp decline
in bank-related commercial paper is the result largely of the following actions of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on August 17, 1970: (1) the imposition of a
five percent reserve requirement on funds receivd by bank affiliates through the issuance of
commercial paper, effective September 17, 1970; (2) the withdrawal of the authority
of Federal Reserve banks to waive penalties for deficient reserves resulting from the issuance
of commercial paper by bank subsidiaries; and (3) the reduction of the reserve requirement on commercial bank time deposits in excess of $5 million from six percent to five
percent, effective September 17, 1970. These controls in effect subjected bank-related
commercial paper of less than thirty days maturity to demand deposit reserve requirements, and such paper of longer maturities to time deposit requirements. Schadrack &
Breimyer, supra note 17, at 290.
28 In May, 1970, commercial paper directly placed by finance companies totaled $19.30
billion, or forty-nine percent of the entire market. See FEn. Rrs. BULL., July, 1971, at A 33.
In February, 1972, commercial paper directly placed by finance companies totaled $17.84
billion, or fifty-five percent of the entire market. See FED. Ras. BuLL., Apr., 1972, at
A 33. For the proportion of commercial paper to total funds of sales finance companies,
see R. SEDEN, supra note 1, at 47, table 12. Since finance companies are major providers
of consumer credit, the commercial paper market is a significant channel through which
funds flow to individuals.
29 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 280-83; Trends in Commercial Paper,supra
note 4, at 5. Between December, 1965 and May, 1970, directly placed nonbank paper rose
from $7.2 billion to $19.3 billion, and the number of direct issuers increased from 22 to 28.
Johnston, supra note 12, at 62. During the same period, dealer paper swelled from $1.9
billion to $14.0 billion, and the number of nonbank issuers of dealer paper increased from
about 300 to almost 550. Id. The preceding figures exclude commercial paper issued by
commercial bank affiliates and subsidiaries because bank-related paper became significant
only in 1969. See FED. Rxs. BUL., Jan., 1970, at A 37. As of February, 1972, direct paper
outstanding was $19.46 billion, while dealer paper outstanding amounted to $12.79
billion. See Fan. Ras. BuLL., Apr., 1972, at A 33.
30 A. G. Becker & Co.; The First Boston Corporation; Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Lehman
Commercial Paper, Inc.; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.; and Salomon

Brothers. The number of dealers has undergone a steady decline since 1920, when there
were thirty firms in this sector of the market. Most of the reduction took place between
1927 and 1933, when the number of dealers fell from twenty-seven to thirteen. R. SELmEN,
supra note 1, at 13.
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in amounts below twenty-five thousand dollars. 31 The dealer provides
the issuer with marketing advice, distribution facilities, and flexibility
in entering or temporarily withdrawing from the market as business
needs or interest rate considerations may suggest. In selling the paper,
the dealer typically acts as principal and purchases paper for his own
account from issuers. The dealer is compensated by the spread between
the price at which he buys the paper from the issuer and the price that
he charges the investor. The current spread is one-eighth of one percent.3- 2 In acting as -principal, the dealer assumes the risk of market
fluctuations that may occur before the paper is sold.33 While this
is the traditional method, some dealers will occasionally handle the
34
selling arrangements for an issue without buying the paper.
About sixty percent of the paper sold by dealers in recent years has
been issued by "nonfinancial corporations and others," a group composed principally of industrials and utilities.35 Finance companies
account for most of the remainder of dealer paper, with bank-related
commercial paper comprising only a small percentage of the dealer
market.36 While the finance companies have typically been in the
dealer market on a year-round basis, this was not true of the nonfinancial corporations until recently. In the past, commercial and
industrial firms used commercial paper almost exclusively to meet
predictable periodic needs for funds.3 7 Today, however, this is no
longer characteristic, and a number of nonfinancial corporations are
constantly in the market through the dealer mechanism28
B.

The Investor

Until the closing decades of the nineteenth century, commercial paper
consisted largely of trade notes received in payment for goods, which
the recipients then endorsed over to banks, their own creditors, or note
brokers who in turn sold them to banks.39 In the 1920s and 1930s, com31 Johnston, supra note 12, at 58; Interviews, supra note 5; see Schadrack & Breimyer,
supra note 17, at 281.
32 Johnston, supra note 12, at 58; Interviews, supra note 5.
33 The cost to the dealer of financing commercial paper inventory (typically by direct
loans from large banks, with the commercial paper serving as collateral) increases the risk
that his costs of sale will be greater than his spread. See N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 52.
34 Johnston, supra note 12, at 58. This practice, however, is common only among the
larger dealers and certain of their less credit-worthy customers. Interviews, supra note 5.
35 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 282, table I.
36 Id.
37 N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 10; R. FouLxE, supra note 1, at 143-45; Schadrack &
Breimyer, supra note 17, at 281.
38 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 281.
39 R. S.LDEN, supra note 1, at 1; see N. BAxTER, supra note 1, at 2-7; note 6 supra.
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mercial paper was bought essentially as a secondary bank reserve. 40 All
but perhaps one percent of the paper issued wound up in the portfolios
of banking institutions.41 Those mercantile concerns that did invest in
commercial paper generally restricted themselves to industries that
were related to their own line of business and in which they were presumably competent to judge the credit standing of the issuer.42 It was
not until the mid-1930s, after the enactment of the federal securities
laws, that the nonbank investors, primarily nonfinancial corporations,
began to enter the market in significant force.4 3 By the early 1940s,
44
banks were no longer the major holders of directly placed paper.
Since the early 1950s, there has been an increasing trend on the part
of nonfinancial corporations to reduce their proportion of non-interestbearing demand deposits in order to put their excess funds to work in
the money market to earn some return. A large volume of funds that
had formerly been kept idle or in government securities has been made
available for investment in the commercial paper market. 45 It has
been estimated that in late 1961, nonfinancial corporations held more
than sixty-one percent of outstandings in the direct paper market.46 In
the dealer sector, it is probable that the bulk of dealer paper was held
by banks until 1957 and that only thereafter were they displaced as
47
the major holders by nonfinancial corporations.
The commercial paper market currently serves a diverse group of
investors. Nonfinancial corporations and a wide variety of "other" investors, including colleges and universities, pension and trust funds,
and foreign institutions, have clearly supplanted commercial banks as
the major purchasers of paper.48 Estimates for the first three quarters of
40 The Federal Reserve Board requires member banks to hold as reserve assets an
amount of uninvested funds equal to a designated proportion of their deposits. Secondary
reserves are particular loans and investments with a high degree of liquidity, which may
be converted into reserves if necessary without risk of material loss of principal. W.
WEIMNG, MONEY AND BANKING 138 (1937). Reserves may be obtained by discounting
eligible secondary reserves at Federal Reserve banks. See text at notes 193-207 infra.
41 R. FOULKE, supra note 1, at 11; Steiner, supra note 1, at 923. Between 1920 and 1938,
there was probably an absolute decline in corporate commercial paper holdings. R. SELDEN,
supra note 1, at 9-10.
42 N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 13; R. FOULKE, supra note 1, at 11.
43 R. SMDEN, supra note 1, at 25, 27. Probably the two major factors responsible for
the entrance into the direct paper market of an increasing number of nonfinancial
corporate investors were the willingness of the increasingly important finance companies
to place paper with flexible maturities and the elimination of interest on demand deposits
under the Banking Act of 1933. Id. at 27.
44 R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 27-28, table 9.
45 N. BAXTEm, supra note 1, at 23.
46 R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 25-26, chart 8.
47 Id. at 28-29.
48 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 282, table I. While this shift has also taken

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:362

1970 showed that "nonfinancial corporations and others" held almost
ninety percent of direct paper outstanding, with life insurance companies and commercial banks accounting for the balance. 49 In the
dealer sector in that same period, "nonfinancial corporations and
others" held about half of the outstandings, with commercial banks
and investment companies making up the remainder. 50
While there can be little doubt that the current commercial paper
market is dominated by institutional investors, it is apparent that individual investors are buying paper in the market to a significant extent
and that diverse opportunities exist for the private investor to become
increasingly involved.5 1 Commercial paper is available to the individual investor either through his bank, from a dealer, or from a direct
issuer. As a service for their customers, banks act as agents in purchasing
paper for individual accounts. 52 While dealers now sell a small portion
of their paper to individuals, 3 such transactions are generally not substantial enough to be profitable.5 4 Significantly, one large commercial
paper dealer has computerized its operation so that it can profitably
sell paper on a retail basis in denominations as small as twenty-five
thousand dollars.5 5 Other dealers are exploring new ways of making
commercial paper attractive to private investors. 56 In general, however,
direct paper is more suited than dealer paper to the needs of individual investors because of its availability in smaller denominations and
57
shorter maturities.
The increasing attractiveness of commercial paper is explained in
part by the fact that it is considered to be a low-risk investment carryplace to a large extent in the dealer market, direct paper has long been heavily relied on by
nonbank investors. R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 25.
49 Schadrack
50 Id.

& Breimyer, supra note 17, at 283, table H.

51 Although there are no figures specifying the extent, it is generally acknowledged
that the private investor is significantly involved in the commercial paper market. Interviews, supra note 5.
52 R. SELDEN, supra note 1, at 25; McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 3. See also note 21
supra.
53 One example is the fact situation of Sanders v. Nuveen, Civil No. 70 C 597 (N.D. Ill.,

Nov. 18, 1970), appeals docketed, Nos. 71-1163, 71-1164, 7th Cir., Feb. 26, 1971. The dealer,
John Nuveen & Co., had sold $1.7 million of commercial paper of a small loan company
in denominations as small as $3,000 to approximately fifty investors, many of whom were
individuals. Record at 186-87. See note 111 infra.
54 Interviews, supra note 5.
55 Id. The dealer is Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. Id.
56 Armour, supra note 19, at 11.
57 See text and note at note 21 supra. Recently, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission attempted to prevent the direct issuance by a company of paper in small
denominations, the litigation resulted in a settlement under which the company could
sell notes in denominations of twenty-five hundred dollars. SEC v. Perera Co., BNA SEc.
REG. & L. REP. No. 65, Aug. 26, 1970, at A-5; see note 158 infra.
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5 s
mng a somewhat higher yield than other money market instruments.
Although there is no secondary market in commercial paper, liquidity
is provided by the wide range of maturities available to satisfy investors' needs.5 9 While buyers are expected to hold their paper until
maturity, dealers and direct issuers will on occasion, under informal
"buy-back" agreements, repurchase paper before maturity at an adjusted yield from regular customers experiencing unforeseen cash needs.
Dealers may also at times attempt to find another buyer for paper on a
"best efforts" basis.6 0 From the investor's standpoint, the unsecured
6
nature of the paper is its principal disadvantage. '

C. Self-Regulation in the Commercial Paper Market
The commercial paper market has developed certain safeguards that
are thought to protect participants in the market. The most institutionalized form of self-regulation is the investigation of the financial
position of commercial paper issuers. 62 Credit checks are made by divisions of Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (NCO/Moody's Commercial Paper
4
Division)"3 and Standard & Poor's Corporation and by the credit departments of commercial paper houses.
58 See note 8 supra.
59 Johnston, supra note 12, at 58.
60 Id. at 59; Interviews, supra note 5.
61 See text and note at note 6 supra.
62 In the 1920s and 1930s, commercial paper was sold with a varying option period
(usually ten days) during which the paper might be returned. This option period gave
the purchaser an opportunity to check the credit of the issuer. R. FOULKE, supra note 1,
at 73-80; R. S.LDEN, supra note 1, at 13; Steiner, supra note 1, at 928-24.
63 NCO/Moody's Commercial Paper Division, a division of Dun & Bradstreet's Moody's
Investors Service, Inc., was until August 23, 1971 the National Credit Office, a division
of Dun & Bradstreet. MooDY'S INVESTORS SERvICE, INC., Moov'S INDUsTIAm, Aug. 27, 1971,
at 2625. NCO/Moody's rates prospective issuers in descending order of quality as

"prime-I," "prime-2," "prime-3," or "not rated" and supplies credit information to its

clients. Until August 23, 1971, the National Credit Office had rated prospective issuers
as "prime," "desirable," "satisfactory," or "not rated." Only occasional use was made of
the "desirable" and "satisfactory" categories. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 31, 1971, at 2, col.
4; Interviews, supra note 5. As of January 31, 1972, NCO/Moody's rated 651 issuers of
commercial paper, a group composed of 262 industrials, 166 public utilities, 106 finance
companies, 50 bank holding companies, 49 mortgage finance companies, 11 insurance
companies, and 7 transportation companies. Telephone interview with an NCO/Moody's
Commercial Paper Division representative, Feb. 3, 1972.
64 In 1969, Standard & Poor's began rating commercial paper, but not until mid-1970
did it become established in the rating field. Its paper classifications range from "A-i,"
the highest designation, through "D-3." Loomis, The Row Over Commercial-Paper
Ratings, FORTUNE, May, 1971, at 274; Foldessy, Buyers of Commercial Paper Often Using
Firms' Bond Ratings As PurchasingGuide, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 3, 1970, at 3,col. 2.
For a discussion of the rating procedures of Standard and Poor's, see Harries, How Corporate Bonds and Commercial PaperAre Rated, FINANCIAL ExECUTIvE, Sept., 1971, at 30.
Recently Fitch Investors Service, Inc. began rating commercial paper. Interviews, supra
note 5.
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Both Standard & Poor's and NCO/Moody's base their rating of the
quality of an issuer's commercial paper on considerations such as the
company's net worth, liquidity position, and recent financial performance. 65 Dealers perform credit investigations on issuers for whom they
place paper 6 and generally distribute to their customers a brief finan67
cial analysis of each of these companies.
Among the factors a credit investigation takes into account in appraising the financial soundness of a commercial paper issuer is the company's bank credit line.68 It has been a traditional safeguard of the
market that issuers maintain some form of open bank credit line, equivalent in amount to their commercial paper outstanding. 9 These open
credit lines range from informal understandings between the bank and
the issuer to formal revolving credit agreements between the two parties.
The line of credit is generally extended by a bank on the condition
that there will be no material adverse change in the financial condition
of the potential borrower.70 The theory behind these arrangements is
that an issuer's bank credit line would be available to pay off maturing
debt if the issuer were unable either to roll over or to refinance the
notes. In practice, however, bank credit lines are far from totally reliable as a safety valve.71 When an issuer is in such financial straits that
it is unable either to roll over or to pay off its maturing commercial
65 Until NCO/Moody's changed its credit procedures in mid-1970, it was widely felt
that the difference between a "prime" and a "desirable" rating was mainly a matter of
size. Cloos, supra note 4, at 7; Interviews, supra note 5. The "prime" category covered
companies whose net worth exceeded $25 million, while "desirable" was applied to
companies whose net worth was between $10 million and $25 million. McClintick, The
Credit Checkers, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 13, 1970, at 16, col. 4.
66 John F. Donahue, Vice President of A. G. Becker & Co., has noted: "We don't rely
on NCO [National Credit Office] or S&P [Standard & Poor's] or anyone else at all in our
credit judgment.... We see many names that are rated NCO prime, that we have turned
down in our credit committee." Donahue & Hinds, The Commercial Paper Market: The
Outlook for Placement in 1970, in MONEY AND THE CORPORATION 85, 93 (1970).
67 These one- or two-page analyses contain information about the issuer that may
include such items as the names of the company's management, the amounts and sources
of bank credit lines, recent balance sheets, and ratings of commercial paper and other
financial instruments. Interviews, supra note 5.
68 Harries, supra note 64, at 34, 36.

69 Johnston, supra note 12, at 58; Loomis, The Lesson of the Credit Crisis, FORTUNE,
May, 1971, at 141, 143; Steiner, supra note 1, at 925. An exception to this practice is found
in the case of the largest corporations, typically direct issuers, whose commercial paper
outstanding exceeds the amount that banks could normally cover. Johnston, supra note
12, at 58. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, whose needs in commercial paper
are several billion dollars, is such an issuer. Interviews, supra note 5; see Selden, Commercial Paper, Finance Companies, and the Banks, in BANKING AND MONETARY STUDIES

346, table 7 (D. Carson ed. 1963).
70 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 16; Interviews, supra note 5.
71 See text at notes 89-92, 103 infra.
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paper, the banks can withdraw their support of the issuer's outstand72
ings.
The final important safeguard thought to be operating in the commercial paper market is the sophistication of the investor group.3
Presumably, this group's knowledge of the financial status of the market's issuers provides some protection against the entrance into the
market of financially unhealthy issuers. The pitfall, however, is that
investors in this market have tended to be more concerned with the
names of the issuers and the interest rate differentials than with credit
analysis.7 4
D.

Weaknesses in the Commercial Paper Market

Despite the safeguards that had developed in the commercial paper
market, weaknesses permeated the market's structure in the late 1960s.
The earliest signals of danger in the corporate community were a rapid
decline in corporate asset liquidity75 and access to credit coupled with
an increasing acceptance of a large percentage of debt.7 6 Since the early
1960s, the trend of United States corporations had been overwhelmingly toward more debt and more leverage and, consequently, toward
capital structures that included as little equity as possible. 7 During
this period, the continuing large gap between corporate financing needs
and internally generated funds encouraged the development of new
72 Armour, supra note 4, at 19; Interviews, supra note 5. This may be accomplished
by virtue of an informal understanding or by means of an escape clause in the case of a
revolving credit agreement. Interviews, supra note 5. Russell Hanson, Vice-President of
the First National Bank of Chicago, has noted: "A great deal of emphasis has been placed
on full coverage of borrowings with bank lines of credit but I think it well to remind

ourselves that this is a hedge against a drying-up of the market only, and was never
intended as a safety factor for a company that is well on its way to bankruptcy or one
that has developed serious financial or operating problems." Quoted in The Commercial
Paper Market in 1970, BANKERS MONTHLY, Apr., 1971, at 26, 29.
73 Interviews, supra note 5.
74 Armour, supra note 4, at 19; Interviews, supra note 5; see text and notes at notes 99,
106, 111 infra. Some observers of the market are of the opinion that while many investors
in commercial paper possess a high degree of general financial expertise, many lack familiarity with this market in particular. Interviews, supra note 5.
75 One measure of liquidity is the quick asset ratio, which is defined as the ratio of
cash and United States government securities to current liabilities. While in 1960 the
corporate quick asset ratio was 0.60, it averaged 0.18 in the first three quarters of 1970.
See 1971 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 171, 287, table C-77.
76 After Penn Central, ECONOMISr, Nov. 14, 1970, supp. at xxx.
77 Loomis, supra note 69, at 141. Total debt for United States corporations rose from
$302.8 billion in 1960 to $774.1 billion in 1970, an increase of over 150 percent. See 1972
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESMENT 268, table B-62. Long-term debt for manufacturing
companies jumped from $31 billion to $99 billion during the decade, with the debt-toequity ratio increasing from 0.19 to 0.32. Jallow, Companies in Bondage to Debt, NATION'S
BUSINESS, June, 1971, at 77.
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sources of funds such as commercial paper.78 Heavy capital expenditure
programs and high inventory accumulation reflected a rapidly expanding economy.7 9 Many corporations seemed determined to build new
plants and assembly lines before the inflationary spiral sent their expenditures even higher.8 0 The advantageous rates on commercial paper
caused those who would ordinarily fund their capital expenditures with
long-term debt to turn to commercial paper and short-term bank loans
to avoid locking themselves into onerous rates for extended periods."'
Since it was felt that the investment boom was one of the major contributors to inflation, the Federal Reserve Board in the last quarter of
1968 instituted a policy of extreme monetary stringency.8 2 Corporations responded by turning more strongly to the issuance of commercial
paper and other short-term debt to replace long-term bank loans, which
were becoming increasingly expensive and difficult to procure.83 By
early 1970, this remarkable trend had produced a tremendous quantity
of short-term corporate liabilities 4 and a dangerously low amount of
liquid assets.8 5 The commercial paper market had almost doubled in
86
size within little more than a year.
As borrowers unable to secure sufficient bank credit turned to commercial paper as a supplementary or alternative source of funds, companies added to their financial vulnerability by utilizing these borrowed
short-term funds in order to finance long-term programs, a violation of
one of the basic tenets of corporate finance. 87 Cash flows became dangerously low, and the funds needed for mandatory repayments of long88
term debt and for capital expenditures became scarce.
78 In 1965, the difference for nonfinancial corporations between capital expenditures
and internal funds was $6.2 billion. By the third quarter of 1970, the gap had grown
to $23.5 billion. Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 285, table III.
79 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 6.
80 After Penn Central, supra note 76.
81 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 7. During 1967, 1968, and early 1969, there was a
significant cost advantage in favor of commercial paper as compared with bank borrowing.
Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 283.
82 See, e.g., Snellings, The Federal Reserve System and the Commercial Paper Market,
J. CoM. BANK LENDING, Feb., 1971, at 14, 16.
83 Davidson, Liquidity Patterns in Corporate Financing, MoNTnLY REV. FED. RES.
BANK Rlc:moND, May, 1971, at 2, 3; see Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 283-86;
Snellings, supra note 82.
84 Excessive use of short-term funds limits a firm's financial flexibility during periods
of economic stress and major capital expenditures. McGillicuddy, supra note 7.
85 When the Fed Won the Liquidity Battle, BUsINrss W.EE, Oct. 24, 1970, at 50.
86 In January, 1969, commercial paper outstanding amounted to $21.8 billion. FEm. REs.
BULL., Mar., 1969, at A 35. In May, 1970, it was $39.7 billion. FE. RES. BULL., July, 1971,
at A 33.
87 After Penn Central, supra note 76; McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 10; see, e.g.,
Loomis, supra note 69, at 279; note 103 infra.
88 From the last quarter of 1968 until the first quarter of 1970, the cash holdings of
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One consequence of the tight-money problems of both the banks and
the commercial paper issuers was the collapse of one of the market's
safeguards, the bank credit lines. Whereas all outstanding paper was
once backed fully by bank credit lines, by 1970 many commercial paper
issuers had allowed their volumes of outstandings to rise without negotiating proportionate increases in their credit lines. 89 In addition, many
new companies that had entered the market did not see fit or were
unable to secure lines of credit in support of their issues.90 The tightmoney situation of the banks, meanwhile, prevented allocation of funds
for the traditional back-up credit lines on all outstanding commercial
91
paper.
The very high debt-to-equity ratios and dangerously low cash flows
of a number of firms in the market in 1970, combined with the lack of
bank credit lines in support of much of the paper outstanding, indicates a deterioration in the quality of commercial paper in the late
1960s. 92 The market accepted paper from small, little-known compa-

nies that did not have the financial flexibility to obtain funds elsewhere
on a reasonable basis.9 3 The deteriorating condition of commercial
paper, however, went largely unnoticed in the surrounding inflationary
and tight-money trend of the period. 94 A business psychology developed that began to ignore some of the fundamentals of credit extension.9 Investors in commercial paper became so sensitive to interest
rate differentials that they failed to recognize differences in the credit
positions of the issuers.9 6 A lack of current information for investors
97
on companies that issued paper further compounded this situation.
nonfinancial corporations declined sharply by sixteen percent, while their ownership of

government securities fell seventeen percent. Simultaneously with this drastic decline
in liquid assets, current liabilities increased by twenty percent. After Penn Central, supra
note 76. See also Loomis, supra note 69, at 280.
89 Loomis, sura note 69; Mellon, The Challenge from Commercial Paper, BAmcERs
MONTHLY, May 15, 1969, at 21.
90 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 10.
91 Loomis, supra note 69; Snellings, supra note 82, at 18. Prior to the commercial paper
market boom of the late 1960s, banks had been quite strict about requiring coverage of
paper outstanding by credit lines. In some instances, the ratio of credit to paper outstanding was as high as two or three to one. Gradually, however, coverage of paper outstanding decreased to the point at which back-up credit lines in some cases became the
exception rather than the rule. Interviews, supra note 5.
92 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 289.
93 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 10.
04 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 280.
95 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 9.
90 Id. An additional problem was that many portfolio managers were not trained from
a credit viewpoint and were not closely supervised. Id. See also Armour, supra note 4,
at 19.
97 Liquidity Fears Crease the Paper Market, BusiNFss WmEK, July 11, 1970, at 90, 94.
See generally McOillicuddy, supra note 7, at 14.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:362

Indeed, during the late 1960s and early 1970, the view gained currency
that the quality of paper was improving because large corporate issuers
were entering the market at the expense of smaller borrowers. 98 This
view was indicative of a severe confusion of corporate size with liquidity, a confusion that masked some of the deterioration in the quality
of the commercial paper issued during this period. 99 This tendency
was clearly in evidence in the collapse of the Penn Central Transportation Company.
The Penn Central Transportation Company, 10 0 the nation's largest
railroad and sixth largest nonfinancial corporation, received approval
on June 21, 1970 to file a petition to reorganize under the Federal
Bankruptcy Act. 01 The Penn Central had $120 million of domestic
commercial paper outstanding when it reached the point at which its
paper could no longer be sold.102 By the time the bankruptcy occurred,
it had outstanding $82,530,000 of commercial paper that it had been
unable either to roll over or to refinance and that was not supported
by bank credit lines. 03 All of the paper had been sold by Goldman,
98 For example, in March, 1969, the National Credit Office, in discussing "the market's
growing exclusiveness," said that "the ready availability of top quality paper, coupled
with financial problems of a few finance companies, has tended to weed out lesser rated
paper and many smaller firms have dropped out of the market." Schadrack & Breimyer,
supra note 17, at 289. At one point in mid-1970, the National Credit Office was rating
the paper of 653 issuers, all but 34 of which carried a "prime" rating. McClintick, supra
note 65.
99 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 289; see McClintick, supra note 65.
100 The Penn Central Transportation Company is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Penn Central Company. J. DAUGHEN & P. BINZEN, THE WRECK OF THE PENN CENTRAL 207

(1971).

supra note 17, at 289.
102 Hanna, Taking Heat Off the Commercial Paper Market, 212 Coax. & FIN. CHRON.
1152 (1970). By application filed September 12, 1969, as supplemented October 2, 1969, the
Penn Central Transportation Company had sought authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission under section 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act to issue commercial
paper in the amount of $50 million. The company had at that time $150 million of
commercial paper outstanding. The proceeds of the new issue were to be used (1) to
reimburse the company's treasury, in part for past capital expenditures and matured
obligations; and (2) to replenish its cash. While granting approval of the new issue,
in part because of the "strong financial condition" of the company and the tight money
market, the ICC expressed concern over the Penn Central's reliance on short-term financig for long-term purposes. Noting the traditional use of short-term financing for shortterm needs, the Commission warned that as of June 30, 1969, the Penn Central had a
deficit working capital situation that could be expected to worsen if short-term financing
were increased. The ICC further cautioned that "[t]he exhaustion of short-term credit to
refinance maturing long-term debt or to finance long-term capital expenditures could
expose a carrier to a serious crisis in the event of an economic squeeze, at which time a
carrier may require short-term financing for traditional use." Penn Central Transp. Co.
Notes, 336 I.C.C. 1, 4 (1969).
103 In 1970, the Penn Central had commercial paper outstanding of $193.4 million.
101 Schadrack & Breimyer,

1972]

Commercial Paper and Securities Acts

Sachs & Co., the nation's largest commercial paper dealer, to approximately sixty lenders. 0 4 That confusion of corporate size with liquidity
had occurred could not be denied-the National Credit Office (now
NCO/Moody's) had rated the Penn Central's commercial paper as
"prime"'1 5 until June 1, 1970.106
After the Penn Central entered reorganization, holders of paper
issued by other corporations lost confidence in the commercial paper
market. 07 Their apprehension produced a major run on the market
as nonbank paper outstanding contracted by $3 billion, almost ten
percent, in the first three weeks of July, 1970.108 Recognizing the seriousness of the run on commercial paper,109 the Federal Reserve System
took decisive steps to prevent a domino effect on overall credit conditions." 0
J. DAUGHEN

& P. BINZEN, supra note 100, at 256. Part of the plan to keep the railroad alive
was to roll over the paper as it matured. Between April 21, 1970 and May 8, 1970,
maturities and payments of commercial paper exceeded sales by $41.3 million as a loss
of confidence in the Penn Central surfaced. Part of the outstandings that matured by
May 8 had been redeemed with funds obtained from a $59 million Swiss loan, but there
were still $152.1 million in outstandings to be paid off. By June 30, $75 million of this
amount was coming due. Id. at 263-64. The Penn Central also had revolving credit for
$300 million, which was used by the railroad to cover many types of debt. Id. at 230. By
approximately the end of May, 1970, the last $50 million available was used to pay off
maturing commercial paper. Id. at 271-72.
104 In re Penn Central Securities Litigation, 325 F. Supp. 309, 310 n.1 (J.P.M.L. 1971).
105 See note 63 supra.
106 Loomis, supra note 64. See also note 65 supra. As a result, there was considerable
loss of confidence in the National Credit Office. Interviews, supra note 5. For a discussion
of the National Credit Office just after the Penn Central collapse, see McClintick, The
Credit Checkers, Wall Street Journal, Aug. 13, 1970, at 1,col. 6. Many institutional investors soon turned to companies' bond ratings to determine what commercial paper to
buy. Foldessy, supra note 64, at 3, col. 2; see text at note 116 infra.
107 See Loomis, supra note 69; Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 289; Snellings,
supra note 82, at 17-18.
108 Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 289.
109 In the panic atmosphere that controlled the money markets following the Penn
Central bankruptcy, large amounts of commercial paper simply could not be rolled over.
For example, the outstandings of Chrysler Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of Chrysler Corporation, fell within weeks from $1.5 billion to less than $700 million. There was
a very real danger that the commercial paper market might crumble, touching off a massive credit collapse and a chain reaction of corporate failures. See, e.g., Liquidity Fears
Crease the Commercial Paper Market, BusINEss W=xa, July 11, 1970, at 90; Loomis, supra
note 69, at 143; Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 288-90; When the Fed Won the
Liquidity Battle, supra note 85.
110 The Federal Reserve System's discount policy was temporarily liberalized in order
to assure the availability of funds to banks and their customers. Banks were immediately
informed that the Federal Reserve discount window would be available for increased
member bank borrowings in order to enable banks to make loans to customers wishing to
pay off maturing commercial paper. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board suspended
interest rate ceilings on thirty- to eighty-nine-day certificates of deposit in order to
provide an alternative source of financing to borrowers who were being placed in
financial straits by their inability to reissue maturing commercial paper. The Commercial

The University of Chicago Law Review

[39:362

While the collapse of the Penn Central has by no means exemplified
the trend among issuers of commercial paper, there have been other
significant defaults on paper outstanding in the last few years. 11 As a
2
result of certain of these defaults, litigation was initiated."1 Most of
the litigation has, of course, grown out of the failure of the Penn Central.13
PaperMarket in 1970, supra note 72, at 27; Schadrack & Breimyer, supra note 17, at 289;
When the Fed Won the Liquidity Battle, supra note 85. Perhaps the most important
instance in which the banks came to the rescue of a commercial paper issuer was the
case of Chrysler Corporation, in which funds were provided by 250 banks across the country.
See Loomis, supra note 69.
111 Among them are Mill Factors Corporation, a prominent name in the factoring
business, which defaulted in 1969 on $6.7 million of commercial paper outstanding,
Heavy, Heavy ....
FoRBEs, Aug. 15, 1971, at 21, that had been sold to fifty-odd institutional investors, Heinemann, Financial Collapse and Human Tragedy Stalk Mill Factors,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1969, at 71, col. 1; Winter & Hirsch, Inc., a Chicago small-loan company, which as of February, 1970 ceased to make further payments to its creditors, who
included holders of $1.7 million of commercal paper, Record at 186-87, Sanders v. Nuveen,
Civil No. 70 C 597 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 18, 1970), appeals docketed, Nos. 71-1163, 71-1164, 7th
Cir., Feb. 26, 1971; Pioneer Finance Company, whose commercal paper holders received
approximately fifty cents on the dollar for their $3 million in outstandings when the
company ran into financial difficulties in 1966, Armour, supra note 19, at 21. See generally Heinemann, Pioneer Finance: 'Tight Money' Claims a Casualty, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 26, 1966, at 63, col. 3; and Atlantic Acceptance Corporation, an important name
in Canadian finance, which could not roll over several million dollars of its notes in
1965, Armour, supra note 19, at 21. See generally N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1969, at 89, col. 5.
112 The suit involving the default by Winter & Hirsch is Sanders v. Nuveen, Civil No.
70 C 597 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 18, 1970), appeals docketed, Nos. 71-1163, 71-1164, 7th Cir., Feb.
26, 1971. In 1970, Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sued by two investors for alleged damages
resulting from the purchases of $2.29 million of Mill Factors short-term notes from the
firm. Denying all liability in both actions, Goldman, Sachs paid $50,000 to the plaintiffs
as part of a complex settlement. Allan, Goldman, Sachs, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1971, § 3,
supra note 111.
at 3, col. 5; Heavy, Heavy ....
113 Approximately forty different suits with total claims of $63 million have been
initiated as a result of the sale of the Penn Central's commercial paper. The principal defendant is Goldman, Sachs & Co., which sold the Penn Central paper. The plaintiffs in
these cases alleged that they purchased short-term promissory notes of the Penn Central
from Goldman, Sachs and that the paper became worthless when the petition in reorganization was subsequently filed. They further alleged that Goldman, Sachs violated federal
securities laws, state business laws, and common law rights of the plaintiffs in connection
with the sales of their commercial paper by misstating or omitting material information
possessed by it concerning the financial health of the Penn Central. BNA SEc. REG. & L.
REP. No. 77, Nov. 18, 1970, at A-10; see, e.g., Complaint, Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., MDL Docket No. 56A (J.P.M.L., 1971).
Goldman, Sachs & Co. has reached an out-of-court settlement of certain of these lawsuits
with claims totaling approximately $20 million. One plaintiff reported that it had agreed
to drop its claims against Goldman, Sachs in exchange for twenty percent of the face
amount of the paper plus a share of any payment on the paper that the firm receives in
the Penn Central's reorganization. A representative of Goldman, Sachs has said that the
settlement was a business judgment made to avoid long and costly litigation and that no
party to the settlement conceded any of the allegations made by other parties to the litiga-
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E.

The Market After Penn Central
Since the Penn Central collapse, the commercial paper market has
become a more mature financial market. 1 4 The events of 1970 produced a concern with credit criteria that forced many of the financially
weaker companies, both large and small, out of the market, thus increasing the overall quality of the market's issuers. 115 The emphasis on
credit standards has produced substantially revamped criteria and
operating procedures in the rating services and dealer credit departments."16
Despite its improved condition, many of the weaknesses of the commercial paper market that surfaced in mid-1970 remain as potential
problems. 117 While the market's list of issuers was streamlined in the
wake of the Penn Central bankruptcy, issuers with poor creditability
have survived."18 The continuous rollover of commercial paper, a significant deviation from the original "current transactions" nature of
the market, has also persisted.119 If excessive use is made of the shortterm market in preference to longer-term financing, a firm's financial
flexibility can be effectively curtailed during periods of major capital
120
expenditure or economic stress.
Credit analysis also still presents major difficulties for the commercial
paper market. 121 Although the flow of information among participants
tion. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 18, 1972, at 2, col. 2 (Midwest ed.); Wal Street Journal,
Apr. 27, 1972, at 20, col. 4 (Midwest ed.). See also note 112 supra.
114 Interviews, supra note 5; see McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 13-15. Recently, two new
dimensions were added to the commercial paper market: the offering of commercial paper
in Europe, known as Eurocommercial paper, Innovation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1971, at 100;
and the decision of several banks to adopt a floating prime rate geared to the rate on
ninety-day commercial paper, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 1971, at 4, col. 4.
115 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 13; Interviews, supra note 5.
3136Armour, supra note 4.
117 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 14, 17-19; Interviews, supra note 5. See also text at
notes 69-113 supra.
118 Interviews, supra note 5; see Harries, supra note 64, at 34. See also text at notes
93-99 supra.
119 McGillicuddy, supra note 7; see text at notes 9, 37-38 supra.
120 McGillicuddy, supra note 7.
121 Armour, supra note 4, at 19. See also text at notes 62-67, 95-98, 106 supra. That
effective credit analysis may still be lacking in the commercial paper market was demonstrated in the debate over the credit standing of Chrysler Financial Corporation, a subsidiary of Chrysler Corporation. On March 21, 1971, a few days after the release of Chrysler Corporation's 1970 annual report, the National Credit Office withdrew the "prime"
rating that it had previously assigned to Chrysler Financial. The reason given was the
"unimpressive" earnings record of Chrysler Corporation. Chrysler Financial's commercial paper outstanding dropped from $1.03 billion on March 19 to $889 million on
March 26, $758 million on April 2, and a low of $640 million on April 16. To meet the
rapid runoff of these notes, Chrysler Financial was forced to tap its bank lines of credit.
The decline was stemmed on April 16, when Chrysler's commercial paper received an "A-3"
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in the market has been improved in the past year and one-half, much
progress is needed in providing reliable current information about
issuers in order to allow investors to make effective credit judgments' 22
Further potential problems for the commercial paper market include
dependence on bank credit lines for liquidity,2 excessive use of shortterm credit by issuers of commercial paper,124 failure properly to space
maturities, 25 reliance on size-oriented considerations in purchasing
paper, 126 and the lack of market experience of many portfolio man1 27
agers.
II.

THE SECUITIS ACT OF 1933

Commercial paper of the type currently in use is clearly included
within the definition of a "security" in section 2(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933,128 and the remedies for fraud contained in sections 12(2)129
and 17(a)130 of the Act are consequently available to the investor.
- The 1933 Act prohibits the offering or sale of securities unless they
rating from Standard & Poor's, which cited Chrysler Corporation and Chrysler Financial
as good credit risks. By late June, Chrysler Financial's outstandings were $850 million.
Then, in July, 1971, the National Credit Office restored Chrysler Financial's "prime"
rating. Armour, supra note 4, at 19; Heinemann, Chrysler Unit Gets Top Rating, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1971, at 49, col. 4; see Loomis, supra note 64. The credit rating
war apparently ended when NCO/Moody's upgraded Chrysler Financial's rating on its
new scale on February 11, 1972, see note 64 supra, and Standard & Poor's announced that
it had raised Chrysler Financial's rating from "A-" to "A-2," Wall Street Journal, Mar.
7, 1972, at 23, col. 1 (Midwest ed.). Such a sharp controversy over the soundness of one of the
country's largest corporations leaves open to serious questioning, however, the reliability
of the market's credit judgments. Armour, supra note 4, at 19. See also note 109 supra.
122 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 14; see text and note at note 67 supra.

See text and notes at notes 68-72, 89-91, 103 supra.
See text and notes at notes 75-91 supra.
Since the basic theory of commercial paper is that maturities should coincide with
anticipated collections, which then provide the means of retiring the paper, it is important
for the borrower to space maturities over the entire available spectrum in order to avoid ex123
124
125

cessive pressures on its ability to pay. Day, Wall Street's Commercial Paper Crisis, BusINrss
MANAGEmENT, Sept., 1970, at 42; McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 18-19; see text at note 9
supra.
126 See text at notes 74, 99, 106 supra.
127 See text and notes at notes 74, 96 supra.
128 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1970). The section defines a "security" as follows:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires. . . The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest of participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee
of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
129 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
180 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
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have been properly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission or unless either the securities themselves or the particular
transaction in which they are sold are exempt from the registration
requirements.1 3 1 It has been widely assumed 32 that the registration
provisions do not apply to commercial paper because of the exemption
offered in section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act for certain promissory notes
with an original maturity of less than nine months.1as Where registration is required, important legal and practical consequences result,
including liabilities for untrue assertions or omissions of material fact
in the registration statement, 34 requirements for a satisfactory prospectus and its delivery, 3 and leverage of the SEC through its power
to delay or suspend the effectiveness of registration.'30 Failure to register subjects both the one who offers or sells the securities and the
33
controlling persons of the issuer 13 7 to absolute liability.
Due to the paucity of relevant case law, examination of the question
whether the exemption from registration under section 3(a)(3) of the
1933 Act is applicable to commercial paper must deal in large part with
13 9
legislative intent.
A.

Legislative History and Securities Act Release No. 4412
The original 1933 draft for a federal securities act provided no exemption for short-term notes.140 The section 3(a)(3) exemption of the
131 Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Section 5 is qualified by sections
3 and 4 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-d (1970). Section 3 exempts certain securities from
the registration requirements of section 5, and section 4 exempts certain types of transactions.
The commercial paper involved in the Penn Central litigation was exempt from
registration by virtue of section 3(a)(6) of the 1933 Act, which exempts "[a]ny security
issued by a common or contract carrier, the issuance of which is subject to the provisions
of section 20a of Title 49 [the Interstate Commerce Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(6) (1970).
See also note 101 supra.
132 E.g., Gutmann, Commercial Paper, MAGAzINE oF WALL Sma-Er, Aug. 15, 1970, at 32;
Hershman, The Case for Commercial Paper, DuN's RFvIMw, June, 1968, at 27; When the
Whistle Blew, ECONOMisr, Nov. 21, 1970, at 96. See also note 4 supra.
133 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970). The section provides for the exemption of
[a]ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a
current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance not exceeding nine
months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof, the maturity of which is
likewise limited ....
134 Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
135 Id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
136 Id. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
'37 Id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
138 Id. § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
'39 For a general discussion of the legislative history of the 1933 Act, see Landis, The
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 G~o. WASH. L. Rlv. 29 (1959).
140 The draft was introduced in the House as H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), and
in the Senate as S.875, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933).
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1933 Act came about as a result of the prompting of certain parties,
principally the Federal Reserve Board, during the committee hearings
on this draft.' 41
In letters to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees, the
Board's Secretary recommended an amendment to the original draft that
is in substance identical to section 3(a)(3). 42 The Board thought it apparent that the proposed act was "intended to apply only to stocks,
bonds, debentures, and other similar securities of the kind commonly
known as investment securities, which are issued for the purpose of
obtaining capital funds for business enterprises and are purchased by
persons for investment.' 143 The amendment was suggested because it
seemed to the Board that the Act was "not intended to apply to bankers'
acceptances or to short-time paper issued for the purpose of obtaining
funds for current transactions in commerce, industry, or agriculture
and purchased by banks and corporations as a means of employing
temporarily idle funds."'144
The scope of the section 3(a)(3) exemption-the result of the Board's
distinction between investment instruments and temporary instrumentsl 45-is interpreted in Securities Act Release No. 4412, an advisory
opinion issued in 1961 purporting to recite the legislative history of
that exemption. 146 The SEC said in part:
The legislative history of the [1933] Act makes clear that § 3(a)
(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable paper of a type not
ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper issued to
facilitate well-recognized types of current operational business
requirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal
Reserve banks. 4 7
141 Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 179-483 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 4314];
Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 94-95, 120 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Hearings or S. 875].
142 Letter from Chester Morrill, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Rep. Sam
Rayburn, Apr. 3, 1933, in Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 141, at 180-81; Letter from
Chester Morrill, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board, to Sen. Duncan U. Fletcher, Apr. 3,
1933, in Hearings on S. 875, supra note 141, at 120.

143 Id.

144 Id.
145 See Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 141, at 181-83. The Federal Reserve Board's
eligibility requirements for discounting apparently provided the basis for the Board's
proposal. See Regulation A, Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board, Series of 1928,
in U.S. BOARD oF GovERNos OF THE FEDERAL ESERVE SYsTEm, DIGEST OF R ULINGS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD (1914-1927, INCLUSIVE) 129-37 (1928); text and notes at notes
193-99 infra.
146 Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961).
147 Id.
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On its face, the Release provides four criteria for determining the
applicability to commercial paper of an exemption from the registration and prospectus provisions of the 1933 Act. The paper must be (1)
prime quality negotiable paper, (2) issued to facilitate well-recognized
types of current operational business transactions, (3) discountable at a
Federal Reserve bank, and (4) of a type not intended to be marketed to
the general public.
Two congressional reports issued in connection with the consideration of the Act in 1933 formed the basis of the Release. The House Report on the Act.48 explains that the section 3(a)(3) exemption as finally
enacted applies to "short-term paper of the type available for discount
at a Federal Reserve bank and of a type which rarely is bought by
private investors."' 149 The Release also quotes from a Senate Report' 50
limiting the exemption to commercial paper that is "not intended to
be marketed to the public" and that "ordinarily is not advertised for
sale to the general public."' 51 The Release fails to point out, however,
that the Senate Report was referring to a clause in the original draft
of section 3(a)(3) that would have granted the exemption only "when
such paper is not offered or intended to be offered for sale to the
public"'152 and that the 1933 Act as passed by Congress deleted that
phrasing. This omission later engendered a challenge to the SEC's
interpretation of the scope of section 3(a)(3). 53 Nevertheless, an exam148 H.R. REtP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,

1st Sess. (1933).
149 Id. at 15. See also Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 141; Hearings on S. 875,
supra note 141.
150 S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
151 Id. at 3-4.
152 S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1933), as amended, 77 CONG. REc. 2979 (1933).
153 The SEC's interpretation of the scope of the section 3(a)(3) exemption was challenged
in SEC v. Perera Co., Civil No. 68-1256 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 1, 1969). BNA SEc. REG. & L.
REP. No. 65, Aug. 26, 1970, at A-5. See generally Wall Street Journal, Apr. 2, 1968, at 15,
col. 3. Relying primarily on the 1961 Release, the SEC had sought a permanent injunction
to prevent Perera Company, a dealer in foreign currency, from violating sections 5(a) and
5(c) of the 1933 Act by failing to register commercial paper that it sold in denominations
as small as one thousand dollars. Id. The SEC charged that the small denominations in
which the paper was issued indicated that it was to be marketed to the general public
and that therefore the paper could not qualify for a section 3(a)(3) exemption. In
response, Perera argued that the SEC's discussion in the Release of legislative history was
misleading because it failed to point out that the "general public" requirement in the
Senate Report referred to a clause in the original draft of section 3(a)(3) that had been
deleted in the Act as it was passed. The omission of this fact from the Release, Perera
asserted, indicated that the SEC had "knowingly distributed a deceitful publication,
thereby attempting to entrap corporations into committing violations of section 5 of
the Act." BNA SEc. ME. & L. RaP. No. 65, Aug. 26, 1970, at A-5. Without admission by
either party as to the validity of the allegations or defenses, a settlement agreement was
reached on the procedure to be followed by Perera in the offer, sale, and delivery of its
commercial paper. Under the compromise, Perera would avoid using any written forms
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ination of the 1933 Act offers considerable support for each of the
SEC's four criteria for an exemption.
In 1931, commercial paper was essentially a very sound secondary
reserve for banks. 1 4 The dominance of single-name rather than twoname paper reflected the feeling that a firm selling commercial paper
should be a prime credit risk. 155 One commercial paper dealer, in a
letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee that was holding hearings on the proposed Act, described the then current practice when he
wrote that commercial paper had proved to be the "prime secondary
reserve" for banking institutions. In urging an exemption provision for
commercial paper, in part because it was a prime investment, the
dealer argued that if commercial paper had not always been considered a prime investment for banks, it would not have been eligible for
discounting under the original Federal Reserve Act. 156 On the basis of
these considerations, the SEC appears to have asserted its prescription
in the Release that commercial paper be of "prime quality" in order to
7
be eligible for an exemption under section 3(a)(3).S
That the exemption applies only to paper of a type issued to facilitate
well-recognized kinds of current operational business requirements is
stated explicitly in the statute.6 8 Language substantially similar to the
of solicitations or advertisements, except for an order form that might be sent to present
or former holders of its notes along with a notation that the paper was not being offered
or sold pursuant to a registration statement. The order form would have to be accompanied by a copy of Perera's most recent financial statement. In addition, Perera agreed
that it would not offer or sell any short-term notes in denominations of less than twentyfive hundred dollars and that the proceeds of such sales would be used principally for
the purchase of foreign exchange inventory and the repayment of short-term notes at
maturity. Id. Indicative of the SEC's failure to insist on the validity of its interpretation
in the Release of section 3(a)(3) is its concession that Perera could issue notes in
denominations as small as twenty-five hundred dollars with no limitation on the types
of investors to whom the paper could be sold. During the litigation, the district court
granted a protective order on the ground of executive privilege in order to prevent
Perera from taking the deposition of the SEC official who had been ultimately responsible
for the Release. SEC v. Perera Co., 47 F.R.D. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
154 R. FouLE, supra note 1, at 68; Hearings on HR. 4314, supra note 141, at 182;
see text and note at note 40 supra.
155 N. BAxrTR, supra note 1, at 9; see note 6 supra.
156 Letter from McCluney & Co. to Sen. D. U. Fletcher, Apr. 1, 1933, in Hearings on
S. 875, supra note 141, at 95; see text at notes 197-99 infra. See also R. FoULKE, supra note
1, at 6.
157 See Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961).
158 The specific reference is to a note "which arises out of a current transaction or the
proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions . . . ." Securities
Act of 1933, § 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970). The "current transactions" requirement
is not found in the comparable provisions of other SEC statutes: Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79f(b) (1970); and Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36), 15 U..C.
§ 80a-2(a)(6) (1970).
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"current transactions" phrasing of section 3(a)(3) is also found in the
Federal Reserve Board's letter proposing the exemption. 59 The committee hearings contain further references to the practice of using
commercial paper for "self-liquidating" transactions and "temporary
purposes."' 60 The requirement that the paper be discountable by a
Federal Reserve bank, a concept quite similar to the "current transactions" theory as it was set forth in the Board's letter,161 is contained in
the House Report on the 1933 Act.' 6 2
Although the SEC supported its fourth criterion-that the commercial paper be of a type not ordinarily purchased by the public-with the
Senate Report on a bill that was not enacted, 163 further examination
of the legislative history provides strong evidence of the existence of
such a requirement for an exemption. Statements made during the
House Committee hearings exhibit an understanding that the commercial paper instrument to which the exemption was to be applied was
sold only to banks and not to "the public."'164 Such a qualification was
expressly included in the amended Senate version of the Act, which
limited the exemption to instances "when such paper is not offered or
intended to be offered for sale to the public."'165 In the course of the
Senate debate, the exemption was amended to exclude that clause. The
text of the motion to strike demonstrates that the commercial paper to
which the securities legislation referred was not sold to the general
public and that the original clause requiring that instruments exempted
by section 3(a)(3) not be sold to the general public was deleted in order
to insure that the exemption would be interpreted to include certain
financial instruments, other than commercial paper, that were sold to
the general public. Because commercial paper circulated only among
banks, the provision in the original draft was thought to be unnecessaxy. 166
159 See text at notes 142-44 supra.
160 Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 141, at 180-81; Hearings on S. 875, supra note
141. See also text at note 9 supra.
161 See text at notes 142-44 supra.
162 H.R. RiP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1933). See also Letter from McCluney &
Co. to Sen. D. U. Fletcher, supra note 156.
163 See text and notes at notes 150-53 supra.

164 Hearings on H.R. 4314, supra note 141, at 180-83; Hearings on S.875, supra note
141.
165 S.875, § 2(a), 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), as amended, 77 CONG. REC. 2987 (1933); see
note 166 infra.
166 77 CoNG. REc. 2987 (1933):
Mr. AnAms. ... I move to strike out the words "when such paper in not offered or
intended to be offered for sale to the public."
The matter has been discussed with the Senator from Florida (Mr. FLETc-ER)
[Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency], and it is intended to
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B.

The Four Criteria and the Commercial Paper Market
When the four criteria that the SEC derived from the legislative
history of section 3(a)(3) are analyzed, two points emerge. First, a significant proportion of the commercial paper currently in existence
does not conform to those criteria. Second, with the exception of the
requirement prohibiting sale to the "general public," the criteria no
longer provide a viable basis for determining whether an exemption
should be granted to a particular issue of commercial paper.
1. Prime Quality. Various dictionaries define "prime" as "first class"
or "first in quality."'167 "Prime investment" has been defined as "[a]
first class, gilt-edged, hi-grade investment; one considered so safe, conservative and sound, [that] dividends or interest payments are unquestioned."' 681 The term "prime quality" can, therefore, be interpreted as
referring to paper whose ability to bear interest and to repay debt is
extraordinarily reliable.
Recent defaults on commercial paper clearly indicate that not all
paper is of "prime quality."'169 The current disregard of the "prime
quality" concept is further demonstrated by the marketing of commercial paper that does not receive a "prime" rating.7 0 Moreover, reliance
on such a guideline in determining whether a particular issue must be
protect from the operation of the act certain paper which should not be included
along with commercial paper, since it merely circulates among banks, instead of
the general public.
Mr. FLETcmR I think it is a very good amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFIcER. The question is on agreement to the amendment to the
amendment.
The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
A financial instrument that was sold to the general public in considerable amounts in
the 1920s and 1930s, and that was specifically included within the exemption, is the
banker's acceptance. L. RUFENER, MONEY AND BANKING IN THE UNrrE STATES 309, 362
(1938); R. WEsrERFELD, MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING 922 (1938). See also F. FARNSWORTH
& J. HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoamtrERCUAL LAw 388-89 (2d ed. 1968); W.
WEX.FING, supra note 40, at 139-40. It seems apparent that the section 3(a)(3) exemption
was in general designed to avoid interference with short-term instruments issued to
finance individual transactions in the ordinary course of business, with which banks are
intimately involved. Most of the commercial paper in current use does not fit this description.
167 E.g., BALLANTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 988 (3d ed. W. ANDERSON 1969); F. MooRE,
THE CYCLOPEDIC LAw DICTIONARY 872 (3d ed. 1940).
168 p. WYCKOFF, DICTIONARY OF STOCK MARKET TERms 203 (1964).
169 See text and notes at notes 103, 111 supra. The mere use of the word "prime" in
describing commercial paper would suggest the possibility that some paper may exist that
is not prime. Rhoades, The Secondary Banking System, 46 ROBERT MoRIus ASSOCIATES
BULL. 150 (1963).
170 Interviews, supra note 5. See generally text and notes at notes 62-66 supra. In July,
1970, for example, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. announced that it had eliminated a requirement that the commercial paper that it underwrites and markets be rated
"prime" by the National Credit Office. Wall Street Journal, July 30, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
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registered is subject to serious criticisms. From one perspective, conclusive proof that an issue of commercial paper is not "prime" can be
obtained only when the issuer is unable either to roll over or to refinance the paper. Even if one recognizes that no paper is absolutely
"prime," an attempt to grade commercial paper on a relative scale of
"primeness" still confronts the problem of defining the relevant factors. 17' Widespread disagreement among rating services and dealer
credit departments concerning the basic creditability of commercial
paper issuers reflects the present conceptual confusion among experts in
the area. 7 2 Important considerations, such as the liquidity of the issuer,
have occasionally been ignored by the rating services. 173 If "prime
quality" is to constitute a meaningful standard, then better guidance
must be provided in applying the concept. At present, to utilize "prime
quality" as a precondition for exemption from registration appears to
be a rather impractical and unsatisfactory endeavor.
2. Current Transactions. The "current transactions" concept was
initially defined in 1935 when the section 3(a)(3) exemption was first
applied to short-term collateral trust notes issued by finance companies. 174 Superseding an earlier contrary opinion' 7 5 the SEC stated
in Securities Act Release No. 401 that "current transactions" by finance
companies might properly include (1) the making of loans on, or the
purchase of, notes, installment contracts or other evidences of indebtedness in the usual course of business, or (2) the payment of outstanding notes exempted under section 3(a)(3). 7 6 In Securities Act Release
No. 4412, the SEC in 1961 referred to the items covered by Release No.
401 as "composed of assets easily convertible into cash and... comparable to liquid inventories of an industrial or mercantile company."' 177
Concerning the general applicability of the concept of "current transactions," the SEC required in Release No. 4412 that exempted paper be
"issued to facilitate well-recognized types of current operational business
requirements."' 178 The SEC then offered a definition in the negative to
supplement this requirement:
the current transactions standard is not satisfied where the proceeds are to be used for the discharge of existing indebtedness
171 It does not appear that commercial paper ratings can be relied on to define which
paper is "prime quality." See text at notes 95-96, 98, 106 supra.
172 Interviews, sura note 5; see, e.g., notes 66, 121 supra.
173 See, e.g., text at notes 105-06 supra.
174

See note 6 supra.

175 Securities Act Release No. 388 (June 8, 1935).

176 Securities Act Release No. 401 (June 18, 1935).
177 Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961).
178 Id.; see text at note 147 supra.
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unless such indebtedness is itself exempt under section 3(a)(3);
the purchase or construction of a plant; the purchase of durable
machinery or equipment; the funding of commercial real estate
development or financing; the purchase of real estate mortgages
or other securities; the financing of mobile homes or home improvements; or the purchase or establishment of a business enterprise.179
The meaning of "current transactions" has been most explicitly
defined in the context of the issuance of short-term paper by utilities.
For many years there had been a question whether utilities, which can
possibly have negative working capital, could issue commercial paper
in compliance with the "current transactions" requirement. Since 1963,
the SEC has agreed that utilities satisfy the criterion if issues are limited to a stated proportion of receivables, fuel supply, annual gross receipts, depreciation, or some combination of these amounts.18 0 This
dilution of the "current transactions" concept in the utilities area is
characteristic of its general misapplication in the commercial paper
market.
In the 1920s and 1930s, commercial paper was a self-liquidating instrument that was used to finance the current operational expenditures
of industry. 81 It was the theory at the time that industrial paper was
self-liquidating, whereas finance company paper was not. 82 This theory
was reflected in the discountability regulations of the Federal Reserve
Board, and it was not until October, 1937 that the collateral-trust notes
of finance companies became eligible for discount at Federal Reserve
banks.lsu In order to meet the "current transactions" prescription of
179 Securities Act Release No. 4412 (Sept. 20, 1961).
180 The first such formula was contained in a "no-action" letter to Goldman, Sachs

& Co. dated November 13, 1963 permitting an electric utility to have commerical paper
outstanding in a dollar amount not to exceed (1) the dollar amount of receivables arising
from the sale of electricity and appliances plus (2) the dollar amount of its fuel supply.
Based on this precedent, other types of utilities have received "no-action" letters setting
forth similar formulas. Address by Richard B. Dunn, Vice-President and General Counsel,
New England Electric System, Edison Electric Institute Legal Committee Meeting, April
22, 1968, at 6 (copy on file at The University of Chicago Law Review); see Eggelston,
Short-Term Financing Through Commercial Paper, PUB. UTm. FORT., May 23, 1968, at
27, 30. "No-action" requests and replies were not made public until the SEC adopted
a proposal on October 29, 1970 to make public "no-action" requests and replies for
requests received after December 1, 1970. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5098 (Oct. 29,
1970). See generally Lowenfels, SEC "No-Action" Letters: Some Problems and Suggested
Approaches, 71 CoLuthr. L. RV. 1256 (1971).
181 R. Fouata supra note 1, at 3-4; Steiner, supra note 1, at 924; see text at note 9
supra.
182 N. BAXTER, supra note 1, at 10 n.17.
183 Id. at 20.
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the 1933 Act, companies were advised to segregate completely funds
obtained from financing by means of commercial paper in order to establish proof that the funds were to be used for immediate obligations
rather than for long-term programs. 8 4
At present, almost every conceivable type of manufacturing, mercantile, utility, and finance company is represented in the commercial
paper market for purposes far afield from the nature of the instrument 8 5 for which the section 3(a)(3) exemption was created.8 6 The continuous rollover of the paper 8 7 violates the original premise of the
market-that it be used to provide financing of a current nature for
normally self-liquidating transactions. 8 8 During the market's boom in
the late 1960s and early 1970, for example, issuers were financing longterm programs, including acquisitions, with short-term funds.'8 9
Moreover, the "current transactions" criterion no longer provides
a viable prerequisite for determining the eligibility of an issue of commercial paper for an exemption under section 3(a)(3). The concept of a
short-term loan can easily be lost sight of in the current market. 9 0 Due
to the virtual impossibility of tracing funds, the "current transactions"
standard becomes difficult to apply.191 Particular sources of funds can
almost never be traced to particular working capital or fixed capital
uses. Commingling of funds resulting from diversifications or mergers
makes tracing even more difficult.1 92
3. Discountabilityat a FederalReserve Bank. Member banks of the
Federal Reserve System may borrow from a Federal Reserve bank
184 J.K. LAssER & J.A. GxRARDI, FEDERAL SECURmIS Acr PRocmEnut 54(1934).
185 The Commercial PaperMarket in 1970, supra note 72, at 26 (based on remarks by
J. Russell Hanson, Vice-President of the First National Bank of Chicago); Interviews,
supra note 5. On December 16, 1970, the First Chicago Corporation, of which the First
National Bank of Chicago is a wholly owned subsidiary, requested a "no-action" letter
from the SEC for the issuance without registration of commerdal paper in denominations of not less than one hundred thousand dollars, the proceeds of which were to be
used to make interim construction loans, with loan commitments of up to three years, to
borrowers intending to use the funds to purchase real estate and to finance the construction of income-producing property. The request stated an understanding that such use
of proceeds was consistent with the "current transactions" concept of section 3(a)(3).
Given these facts, the SEC replied that it would take no action if the paper were not
registered. CCH 1971 FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,010.
188 See text at notes 142-45 supra.

See text at note 7 supra.
McGillicuddy, supra note 7.
189 Interviews, supra note 5; see text at notes 81, 87 supra; note 102 supra.
190 McGillicuddy, supra note 7, at 3-4.
1S

188

191 Interviews, supra note 5.
192 Cloos, supra note 4, at 14.
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either by rediscounting193 short-term commercial, industrial, agricultural, or other business paper or by giving their own promissory notes,
secured by paper eligible for discounting, government securities, or
other satisfactory collateral. Borrowings by the first method are known
as discounts and by the latter method as advances. Both types of Federal
Reserve bank lending are referred to as the discount mechanism. 194
Commercial paper may be discounted if it meets the Federal Reserve
Board's eligibility requirements, which are set forth in Regulation
A.195 The interpretation accorded the phrase "current transactions"'9 6
closely resembles these criteria.
When first enacted in 1913, the Federal Reserve Act

97

was based on

the concept that Federal Reserve bank credit should not be used to
promote speculative or investment activity. 98 Through the early 1930s,
the Federal Reserve Board limited eligibility requirements to shortterm, self-liquidating commercial paper in an attempt to confine credit
extended by member banks to short-term productive uses. 199 Since the
commercial paper currently being used is continuously rolled over and
often used for financing long-term investments, 200 it does not in general
conform to the concept of discountability of commercial paper as it was
understood when the section 3(a)(3) exemption of the 1933 Act was
drafted.
193 Rediscounting is the process by which a Federal Reserve bank discounts for a
member bank paper that the member bank has previously discounted for its customers.
F.L.GARCIA, supra note 6, at 652; L. RuFENrn, supra note 166, at 512.
194 U.S.

BOARD OF GovERNoRs

OF THE FEDERAL

RESERVE SYsrEm,

THE FEDERAL

RE-

sERvE SYSTEm 40 (5th ed. 1967).

195 12 C.F.R. § 201 (1970). The relevant eligibility requirements of Regulation A
provide in substance that a Federal Reserve bank may discount for a member
bank a negotiable note, draft, or bill of exchange bearing the endorsement of a
member bank, id. § 201.3(a)(1), that has a maturity not exceeding ninety days (except
agricultural paper, which may have a maturity of up to nine months), id. §
201.3(a)(4); that has been issued or drawn, or the proceeds of which are to be used in
producing, purchasing, carrying, or marketing goods or in meeting current operating
expenses of a commercial, agricultural or industrial business, id. § 201.3(a)(1); and that
is to be used neither for permanent or fixed investment such as land, buildings, or
machinery, id. § 201.3(a)(2), nor for speculative transactions or transactions in securities
(except direct obligations of the United States government), id. § 201.3(a)(3).
196 See text at notes 174-84 supra. See also text and notes at notes 142-45 supra.
197 Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (now 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 et seq. (1970)).
198 C. ANDERSON, EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE DiscouNT MECHAN-

ism 5, 20 (1966); see T. MAYER, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNrrm STATES S0 : n.10 (1968);
note 145 supra.
199 C. ANDERSON, supra note 198, at 21-22, 30, 32, 51; T. MAYER, supra note 196, at 50;
R. W srERiELD, supra note 166, at 652-56. During the 1920s, it was the predominant view
that confining bank credit to short-term productive uses was the means to achieve economic stability and would automatically result in the proper volume of credit. C. AnDERsoN, supranote 198, at 21.
200 See text at notes 7, 81, 87 supra; note 102 supra.
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Moreover, discountability is no longer a suitable criterion by which
to determine the applicability of the exemption to commercial paper.
Over the last forty years, the Federal Reserve System has departed significantly from the principle that Federal Reserve bank credit should
be extended only on the basis of short-term, self-liquidating commercial paper,201 and the concept of eligibility has been diluted to reflect
this development. Eligibility requirements under Regulation A were
expanded in 1937 to include, among other instruments, paper issued
by the increasingly important finance companies. 202 When Regulation
A was again redrafted in 1955, no intention was expressed to structure
the discount policy to limit the final uses of Federal Reserve bank
credit to short-term productive purposes. 20 3 Experience had demonstrated that the type of paper offered for discount afforded no indication
of the specific uses a member bank was to make of the proceeds because
the loan was to cover a reserve deficiency that had already occurred and
that was generally the result of a large number of transactions. 204 In
addition, banks have not discounted eligible paper for several years,
but instead have usually borrowed on their own promissory notes
secured by government securities.20 5 Furthermore, since the standards
of eligibility of commercial paper for discounting are largely the same
as the "current transactions" notion,2 06 the impracticalities associated
with that concept as a precondition for the exemption of section 3(a)(3)
are also to be taken into account in appraising the discountability
criterion. 2 7 When these factors are considered, it becomes evident that
the appropriateness of the discountability criterion as a requirement
201 C. ANDERSON, supra note 198, at 50-51. The departures over the last forty years from
this principle have in part prompted a recommendation to Congress by the Federal
Reserve Board in 1963 that the present eligibility requirements be repealed and that
emphasis be placed on the soundness of the paper offered and the appropriateness of the
purposes for which member banks borrow. Id. at 49-51. No action has been taken on the
proposal. For other recently proposed changes in the discount mechanism, see D. JoNEs,
A REvIEw OF REcErsr AcAD.mic: LrrERATUE ON THE DIscouNT MEcHANIsm 25-36 (1968).
202

N. BAxTER, supra note 1, at 20; R.

WEsrTERFirLD,

supra note 166, at 656. See also C.

ANDERSON, supra note 198, at 33.
203 C. ANDERSON, supra note 198,

at 49. Appropriate and inappropriate uses of the discount windows were, however, discussed during the revision of Regulation A. Id. at
48-49. See generally B. SHULL, RATIONALE AND OBJECIVES oF THE 1955 REvIsION OF REGULATION A (1966).
204 C. ANDERSON, supra note 198, at 22, 28, 50-51.
205 T. MAYER, supra note 198, at 30; Interviews, supra note 5. Banks only occasionally
secure their borrowing by eligible paper; it is usually more convenient to use government securities. T. MAYER, supra note 198, at 30; Interviews, supra note 5; see G. McKINNEY, JR., THE FEDERAL RESERvE DIscouNT WINDOW 64-71 (1960). Some, however, see
MAYER, supra note 198, at

a revival of the use of eligible paper to secure borrowing. T.
31; Interviews, supra note 5.
206 See note 195 supra.
207 See text at notes 185-92 supra.
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for the exemption of commercial paper from the full coverage of the
1933 Act is seriously impaired.
4. Not Marketed to General Public. The objective of the 1933 Act
was to insure that the process of distributing securities to the general
public would be accompanied by registration of the securities and full
208
disclosure of information relating to the underlying investment.
An exemption from the disclosure provisions of the 1933 Act was
provided for commercial paper because in the 1930s the paper was not
sold to the "public," but only to banks.20 9 In contrast, a wide variety
of corporate investors currently participate in the commercial paper
market, and the paper is becoming increasingly attractive to private
investors. 210 Inherent in the 1933 Act's purpose was the prevention of
just such widespread sales to the investing public without the protections afforded by disclosure. 211
Moreover, unlike the criteria of "prime quality," "current transactions," and "discountability," the requirement that the paper be of a
type not intended to be marketed to the general public remains a
viable standard for determining eligibility under the section 3(a)(3)
exemption. 21

2

It is both reasonable and practical to adopt the principle

that when commercial paper is offered to the public, the blanket exemption of section 3(a)(3) should no longer be applicable. 218
208 See, e.g., SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953); Message of President
Roosevelt to Congress, March 29, 1933, 77 CONG. REc. 937, 954 (1933).
209 See text at notes 89-43, 143-46, 154-55, 164-66 supra.
210 See text at notes 48-57 supra.
211 See materials cited note 208 supra. In 1957, the SEC's New York Regional Administrator brought an action to enjoin the sale of unregistered securities by a corporation that
had made an offering of nine-month notes in denominations of one hundred, five hundred,
and one thousand dollars to finance the promotion of various real estate ventures. The
SEC charged that such a widespread sale of securities to the investing public in order
to provide capital for a business venture without registration under the 1933 Act was in
violation of the Act. The case became moot when the defendant registered. SEC v. Sire
Plan, Inc., Litigation Release No. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
The SEC again dealt with the subject of "sale to the general public" in 1971 when
counsel for Delaware Valley Realty and Mortgage Investors, a common law business trust
that intended to qualify as a real estate investment trust in 1972, sought a "no-action"
letter for the sale of its commercial paper without compliance with the 1933 Act's
registration requirements. The notes were to be sold in multiples of five hundred dollars
to existing stockholders of the company's parents. The proceeds were to be used to
purchase consumer discount notes carrying maturities of up to forty-eight months. In
denying the request, the SEC cited as reasons the small denominations of the securities,
the "unsophisticated" character of the offerees, and the proposed use of the proceeds.
BNA SEc. REG. & L. REP. No. 104, June 2, 1971, at C-1.
212 Such a concept is familiar to the regulation of securities in determining the applicability of the private offering exemption of section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. See text at
notes 225-32 infra; ef. People v. Walberg, 263 Cal. App. 2d 286, 69 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968).
218 In connection with the explanation of the House Report on the 1933 Act that the
section 3(a)(3) exemption applies to paper of a type "which rarely is bought by private
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C. Regulation Under the 1933 Act
The expanded uses of commercial paper in the current market make
it apparent that the reasons put forth in 1933 for an exemption from
registration are no longer persuasive. Assuming that the 1933 Act's disclosure philosophy continues to be sound,2 14 it is both inconsistent and
unjustifiable to permit commercial paper to remain outside the full
coverage of the Act.
While incursions upon the present regulatory structure are demanded by the current commercial paper market, the weighing of the
relative advantages of various changes in the regulatory scheme for
commercial paper must take into consideration the degree of impairment of the principal attraction of commercial paper for the issuerits low cost in relation to the amount of money that can be raised
quickly and efficiently. To subject commercial paper to registration for
each issue would virtually rule out its use.215 Because of the need to
adjust the terms and amounts of each offering to rapidly changing
market conditions, the time required for full registration of each issue
would be prohibitive. 216 In attempting to preserve commercial paper as
a valuable source of credit, one can approach the problem of the market's regulation under the 1933 Act in several ways.
One suggestion that has been advanced is to exempt from registration
short-term notes in amounts above a large minimum denominationfor example, one hundred thousand dollars.217 The underlying theory
investors," see text at notes 148-49 supra, Professor Loss suggests that limiting the section 3(a)(3) exemption to paper that is "privately offered" would make it redundant in
view of the nonpublic offering exemption of section 4(2). 1 L. Loss, SEcuRrriEs REGuIATON
567 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969). While there may be some overlap between the two exemptions, instruments of a type rarely bought by "private investors" will not, however,
necessarily be involved in "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,"
either as these concepts were understood by the drafters of the 1933 Act or as they
are currently interpreted.
214 The efficacy of the basic concept of disclosure in the regulation of corporate

securities is the subject of a distinct controversy not within the scope of this comment.
For critical analyses of the disclosure philosophy, see H. MAux, INSIDER TRADING AND
(1966); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE

THE STOCK MAR=

L.J. 717 (1933); Morton & Booker, The ParadoxicalNature of Federal Securities Regula.
tions, 44 DENvER LJ. 479 (1967); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets,
37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). But see L. BRANDEIS, OTER PE PLE's MONEY (1933), reprinted from
HAPER's Wmmxy, 1913-14; SEC, DiscosuRx TO INvEsroRs (1969); Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALF. L. Rrv. 408 (1962); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role
of Disclosure, 62 Micn. L. Rzv. 607 (1964); Wheat, "Truth in Securities" Three Decades
Later, 13 How. LJ. 100 (1967). See also SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the Future Structure of the Securities Market, Feb. 2, 1972.
215 Compliance with the prospectus requirements of sections 5(b) and 10 of the 1933
Act poses no burdens peculiar to the commerdal paper market. Interviews, supra note 5.
216 Cloos, supra note 4, at 13; Liquidity Fears Crease the Paper Market, supra note 97;
Interviews, supra note 5.
217 Federal Securities Code §§ 216A, 801(n) & Comments 1-5 (rent. Draft No. 1, 1972);
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is that one who can afford to purchase paper in this large 'amount is
presumably so sophisticated an investor that the protections of the 1933
Act are unnecessary. Such a limitation, however, would not be in keeping with the congressional purposes of full disclosure of information
to all investors. Potential purchasers of commercial paper who might
very well need the protections afforded by registration would be required to make investment decisions without access to the information
21
essential to comprehensive judgments. .

More in accord with the purposes of the 1933 Act would be to provide some form of "shelf registration" procedure for commercial paper
-that is, the procedure by which a security is permitted to be registered even though it is not intended to be marketed to the public immediately after the registration statement is declared effective.-"9 Paper
registered "for the shelf" could be offered over an appropriate period
of time, perhaps one year. Posteffective amendments to the registration
statement would be employed to update information about the commercial paper issuer and to specify the amounts, terms, uses of the pro221
ceeds, 22 0 and other data for each offering.

The registration of commercial paper for deferred distribution would
accommodate the special needs of the market while insuring investors
both a reasonably current flow of information about the market's borrowers222 and the enjoyment of more comprehensive rights of action
against the issuer and the vendor. 223 Moreover, such a registration
scheme would further streamline the commercial paper market by sifting out of the market those marginally healthy companies that could not
224
survive the light of disclosure.

Interviews, supra note 5. Another approach is to combine this denominational lim-

itation with the requirement that the exemption be further confined to companies
that also report under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (sections 12 and 13, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 781-m (1970)). Id. While this additional prerequisite to an exemption is appropriate
in light of the current promotion of coordinated disclosure under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
see, e.g., SEC, DiscsosuRE To INv~sroRs (1969); Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1340 (1966), it would not provide the complete disclosure, necessary in
each issue of commercial paper by every issuer, see text at notes 218-24 infra.
218 See 1 SEC, DIscLosuRE TO INvEsroRs 10, 46 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 8 (1933); cf. cases cited note 267 infra.
219 This procedure is thoroughly discussed in Hodes, Shelf Registration: The Dilemma
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 VA. L. REv. 1106 (1963). For more concise
treatments, see 1 L. Loss, supra note 213, at 296-300, 537-38, 685-86; R. JENNINGS & H.
MARSH, SEcuRTEs REGULATION: CAsEs AND MATEIuALs 201-04 (1968).
220 Disclosure of uses to be made of the proceeds of an issue of commercial paper is an
important item of information not revealed elsewhere. See text at notes 87, 181-92 supra;
note 84 supra.
221 See Hodes, supra note 219, at 1107.
222 Interviewis, supra note 5. See also text at notes 96-99 supra.
223 See text and notes at notes 134, 138 supra.
224 Interviews, supra note 5.
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The removal of the section 3(a)(3) exemption would not, of course,
affect the eligibility of commercial paper for the exemption provided
in section 4(2) of the 1933 Act for "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering." 225 While the applicability of the private
offering exemption turns on a consideration of "all the surrounding
circumstances, ' 226 the issuance of both dealer and direct paper can
qualify as a private offering in certain circumstances. 227 In the case of
dealer paper, even though the dealer purchases the paper with the intent to resell it, the entire two-step transaction can still constitute a
private offering if the offerees do not include members of the general
public. On the other hand, if the dealer engages in a distribution, a
term that the SEC has tended to equate with a public offering, what
may begin as a private offering can proliferate into a two-step public
offering, and the dealer may be liable as an "underwriter" under section 2(11) of the 1933 Act. 228 In the case of direct paper, similar problems of leakage in the private offering are involved. 229 Due to both the
vague criteria of the private offering exemption and the tremendously
varied marketing practices among dealers and direct issuers, a comprehensive consideration of the applicability of the exemption for the
commercial paper market would not be practical here.2 30 Since the exemption is directed to activities in the offering of securities "where
there is no practical need for [the application of the registration requirements] or where the public benefits are too remote," 2n the adaptation, to whatever extent necessary, of the practices of the commercial
paper market to the private offering exemption could prove fruitful
to its participants. As the market continues to expand and to diversify,
225 General discussions of this exemption for nonpublic offerings are found in R.
JENNINGS & H. MARsH, supra note 219, at 368-71; 1 L. Loss, supra note 213, at 653-65;
Israels, Some Commercial Overtones of Private Placement, 45 VA. L. Ray. 851 (1959);
Orrick, Non-Public Offerings of Corporate Securities-Limitations on the Exemption
Under the FederalSecurities Act, 21 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 1 (1959); Victor & Bedrick, Private
Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 VA. L. Ray. 869 (1959).
226 1 L. Loss, supra note 213, at 654.
227 Two important discussions of the requirements for the exemption are SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953), and Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935).
228 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 219, at 368; see
Orrick, Some Interpretative Problems Respecting the Registration Requirements Under
the Securities Act, 13 Bus. LAw. 369-72 (1958). The exemptions provided by other sub-

sections of section 4 are inapplicable to transactions in dealer paper because of various
practices in that sector of the market.
229 See R. JENNINGS & H. MjAmSH, supra note 219, at 368.
230 Such a consideration is also complicated by the very loose practices that have

developed in recent years in the application of the self-administered private placement
exemption. Id. at 371. Indications are, however, that the private offering exemption
would not be very useful to the current market. Interviews, supra note 5.
231 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
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however, resort to the private offering exemption becomes increasingly
difficult.
III. THE SEcuRmEs EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934
In its definition of the term "security," section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934232 excludes from the coverage of the Act
notes with an original maturity of less than nine months asa If a security

falls within the definition of section 3(a)(10), investor protection is afforded by provisions that include liabilities for fraud,234 registration
for brokers and dealers,235 liability for misleading statements, 23 6 and
investigation and prosecution powers of the SEC. 2 37 Since it has a
maturity of less than nine months, commercial paper appears to be
expressly excluded from the definition of a "security" under the terms
of section 3(a)(10). When the economic realities of the current commercial paper market are considered, however, it becomes difficult to

justify the failure to provide the same protections to investors in commercial paper that the 1934 Act affords to investors in other types of

nonequity securities.

238

A. Section 3(a)(10) and Plain Meaning
Recent judicial discussions have approached the problem of defining
the scope of the exclusionary provision of section 3(a)(10) in terms of
the "plain meaning" principle of statutory interpretation.23 9 In essence,
232 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
233 Section 3(a)(10) excludes from the definition of a "security" for the purposes of the
Act "any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof, the maturity of which is likewise limited."
234 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and SEC Rule
lob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, lob-5 (1970), promulgated thereunder; Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1970); id. § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
235 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (1970). Both sections
15(a)(1) and 15(c)(1) contain language including within their coverage "any security (other
than an exempted security or commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, or commercial
bills)." There is no explanation in the legislative history for such phrasing. It may be
assumed that the language is merely a specific enumeration of certain instruments meant
to be excluded from the definition of a "security" in section 3(a)(10).
236 Id. § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
237 Id. § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1970); id. § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1970).
238 Sanders v. Nuveen, Civil No. 70 C 597 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 18, 1970), appeals docketed,
Nos. 71-1163, 71-1164, 7th Cir., Feb. 26, 1971, is before the Seventh Circuit on the question whether the holder of commercial paper on which there has been a default is protected by the 1934 Act. The district court, without rendering an opinion, denied a motion
to strike the claims under the 1934 Act. Argument was heard by the Seventh Circuit on
January 26, 1972. See also notes 53, 111 supra.
239 These discussions were all at the district court level. Investment Properties Intl,
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the rule provides that where the statute is clear and unambiguous and
a literal reading does not give rise to absurd or mischievous consequences or thwart a manifest purpose, courts shall base their decisions
on this reading alone. 240 It is clear, however, that while the courts in
these recent cases have claimed to construe the exclusionary provision
of section 3(a)(10) according to its express language, they have in fact
demonstrated a willingness to seek the assistance of legislative intent in
light of commercial realities.24 ' Greater reliance on the legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation has gradually eroded the
former rigidity of the "plain meaning" rule. 242 This expanded search for
the "fair construction" 243 of a statute is particularly appropriate in the
application of section 3(a)(10) to commercial paper because the 1934
Act is presently confronted with circumstances not contemplated at the
time of its passage. 244 The evolution of the commercial paper market
demands that the exclusionary provision no longer be taken on its face
as the sole evidence of legislative intent. A construction of that clause
must be compatible with the broad purposes of the 1934 Act and the
245
commercial realities of the market.
Toward a Construction of Section 3(a)(10)
There is no explanation in the legislative history of the 1934 Act for
the exclusionary provision of section 3(a)(10). The only distinction beB.

Ltd. v. I.O.S., Ltd., CCH 1972 FED. SEc. L. REP. 93,011, at 90,739 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1971);
Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam,
452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co.,
300 F. Supp. 1083, 1100 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (dictum), aff'd, 430 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd,
404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also G.A.F. Corp. v. Milstein, 324 F. Supp. 1062 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
240 For treatments of the "plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, see Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1947); Jones,
The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes,
25 W-AsH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Note, A Re-evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in
Federal Courts, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 125 (1952); Note, The Plain Meaning Rule in the
Reflection of Current Trends and Proclivities,26 Trmn. L.Q. 174 (1952).
93,011,
241 Investment Properties Intl, Ltd. v. I.O.., Ltd., CCH 1972 FED. SEc. L. REP.
at 90,734-36 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1971); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp.
806, 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Superintendent of
Ins v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 300 F. Supp. 1083, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 430 F.2d
355 (2d Cir. 1970), rev'd, 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 3, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970). The instruments involved
in these cases were essentially singular in number and were quite unlike commercial paper.
242

E. FARNswoRTH,

AN INTRODUCON TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM oF THE UNrrED STATES

72-73

(1963); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, 2 HA~v. J. LEGis. 7, 13 (1965), reprinted
from HAIvARD LEGAL ESSAYS (R. PouND ed. 1934); see materials cited note 240 supra.
243 Frankfurter, supra note 240, at 545.
244 See Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
'Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAuN. L. RXv. 395, 400 (1950).
245 See id. at 401.
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tween this exclusionary language and the exemption provided in section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act is the omission in the former of the
phrasing, "which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of
which have been or are to be used for current transactions." This distinction is reflected in the cautious treatment that Professor Loss accords the relationship between the two sections: "Short-term notes of
the type which are exempted from registration under the Securities
Act by Section 3(a)(3) are excluded from the definition of 'security' in
246
the Exchange Act [section 3(a)(10)]."

Reference to the legislative history of the 1934 Act sheds no light on
the importance or meaning of the difference between the two sections.
The original draft of the 1934 Act, introduced in the Senate on February 9, 1934247 and in the House on February 10, 1934,248 provided no

exclusion for short-term notes. H.R. 8720, introduced in the House on
March 19, 1934, contained a definition of a "security" that by its terms
excluded only those short-term obligations arising "out of a current
transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for
current transactions, '249 language identical to that used in section
3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act. After the "current transactions" phrasing was
omitted and then restored in subsequent bills in the House 250 and
Senate, 251 the reference to "current transactions" was deleted from the
exclusionary language of the definition of a "security" in the final
version of the 1934 Act. 252 Since there is no legislative comment with

respect to this deletion, it cannot be gainfully surmised whether the
omission of the "current transactions" phrasing was an inadvertent mistake, an assumption on the part of the legislature that the clause was
unnecessary, or a conscious attempt to distinguish section 3(a)(10) of
2 53
the 1934 Act from section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act.

The only judicial treatment of the relationship between the exclu2 L. Loss, supra note 213, at 796 (emphasis in original).
S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). See also Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S.
Res. 97 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 15-16
246

247

(1934).
248 H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3.10 (1934). See also Hearings on H.R. 7852 and
H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934).
249 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(10) (1934). S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (introduced on
April 20), the next securities bill to be considered, contained the "current transactions"
language in section 3(a)(10).
250 H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(10) (1934) (dated April 26).
251 H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(a)(10) (1934) (Senate version).
252 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1934).
253 See generally H. BLAcK, CONSTRUCMON AND INTERPRErATION OF THE LAws § 105 (2d
ed. 1911).
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sionary language of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act and the exemption
of section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act is found in Anderson v. Francis I.
du Pont & Co. 254 In that case, the defendant solicited money from the
plaintiffs to invest in the commodities market with the guarantee that
it would be returned to them at a profit. In return for their money, the
plaintiffs received two promissory notes, one with a maturity of less
than nine months. After holding that the transaction was in substance
an investment contract cognizable as a "security" within the 1934 Act,
the court said that even if the instruments in question were considered
to be notes, one carrying a maturity of less than nine months, the exclusionary language of section 3(a)(10) would be inapplicable. The
court's discussion is of interest:
The exclusionary language of Section 78c(a)(10) [section 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act] is virtually identical to the language of section
3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act and applies to the same type of short-term
notes as the 1933 Act. 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 797-98 (2d
ed. 1961). Both these sections apply to "short-term paper of the
type available for discount at a Federal Reserve bank and of a
type which rarely is bought by private investors," 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 566-68 (2d ed. 1961), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933). The notes involved in this case are
clearly not of the type Congress intended to exclude from coverage.255
What the court did in effect was to equate, without analysis, 256 the interpretation of section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act with that of section
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. While it must be acknowledged that the court
was not dealing specifically with commercial paper, the court did state
that both sections apply to the same type of short-term notes and that
the "discountability" and "private investor" concepts of the 1933 Act
also apply to the 1934 Act. Since "current transactions" has been given
virtually the same definition as "discountability,"2 57 it is only a short
step to the adoption of the "current transactions" criterion in the interpretation of section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act.
When it is recalled that the "current transactions" concept was fundamental to the type of instrument that the Seventy-third Congress
intended to isolate from the full investor protections of both federal
291 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1968).
at 708-09 (dictum).
256 With respect to the latter citation by the court to Loss, Professor Loss's reference
is only to section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act and does not support the court's assertion of
254

255 Id.

identity.
257 See text at notes 174-79 supra; note 195 supra.
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securities acts, 25 8 the appropriateness of the court's approach in Ander-

son becomes evident. The construction of the exclusionary provision of
section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act in terms of the legislative history of
the section 3(a)(8) exemption of the 1983 Act is particularly proper in
this instance because of the companion scope and aims of the two
federal securities acts2 59 and because of the absence in the legislative
history of an explanation for the exclusionary language of section
3(a)(10).
Moreover, consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Tcherepnin v. Knight 260 indicates that the inquiry into what constitutes a "security" need not be limited to the literal definition of the term in section
3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act. In that case, the Court held that a withdrawable capital share in a savings and loan institution is a "security" within
the meaning of section

3(a)(10).2 61

In setting forth the groundwork on

which it reached its conclusion, the Court, while not specifically concerned with the section's exclusionary provision, furnished two valuable
guidelines for the construction of the section. First, since the 1934 Act
is remedial legislation, the Act, and in particular the definition of a
"security" in section 8(a)(10), should be given a broad interpretation
in order to fulfill the purposes of the Act. Second, the term "security"
should be defined with regard to substance rather than form and should
emphasize economic reality.262 Applying the Court's reasoning in
Tcherepnin to the realities of the commercial paper market, one finds
it inconsistent to exclude commercial paper from the Act's coverage.
Commercial paper has become a popular investment instrument for a
diverse sector of the public. In accordance with the 1984 Act's purposes,
the present usage and investment character of commercial paper should
be recognized by its inclusion within the full provisions of the Act.
See text at notes 9, 142-45, 158-62, 181-84 supra.
See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 889 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967). For discussions of this in
pari materia canon of statutory construction, see H. BLAcK, CONSRUCriON AND INTERPREATMON OF THE LAWS § 104 (2d ed. 1911); J. SUMMAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§§ 443-48 (2d ed. 1904). While the 1933 Act is concerned primarily with the protection
of the investors through effective disclosure in the sale of new securities, one of the central
purposes of the 1934 Act is the protection of the public in its financial investment in post258

259

distribution trading on the over-the-counter market and the securities exchanges.
1 L. Loss, supra note 218, at 130-31. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858
.(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.-976 (1968); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 78d Cong., 2d Sess.

11 (1983).
260

389 US. 332 (1967).

261 Id. at

845.

Id. at 835-86. Even the form of commercial paper has changed to some extent.
See note 6 supra.
262
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C. Regulation Under the 1934 Act
The principal ramification of the inclusion of commercial paper
within the 1934 Act is the applicability of rule lOb-5 liabilities to the
purchase and sale of the paper. While two of the antifraud provisions
of the 1933 Act are applicable to commercial paper, 63 neither is as farreaching as rule l0b-5, 64 which, although little used in its early years,
now generates as much litigation as all of the other general antifraud
provisions of the federal securities acts taken together. 26 5 Recent cases
have expanded the protection of rule lOb-5 to include private corporate dealings, transactions that are much less amenable to the rule's
coverage than commercial paper. 266 To provide investors in commercial
-paper with the rights of redress under rule lOb-5 would merely grant
the same important remedial protections that investors in other securi267
ties currently enjoy.

CONCLUSION

Commercial paper has become a vital form of financing and a significant investment instrument. Whether the present inconsistencies in the
market's regulatory aspects should be approached by legislative reform, 268 administrative action, 269 or close judicial scrutiny of the eco-

nomic realities is a subject for further inquiry. 270 What is in evi263 See text and notes at notes 129--O supra.
264 Rule lOb-5 is the most effective antifraud remedy of the federal securities acts
because of its broad coverage of persons and transactions, absence of express defenses, and
procedural advantages. A. BRomoERG, SECURns LAw: FRAUD-SEC RuIm lOb-5 §§ 2.3(800),
2.5 (1971 ed.); W. CARY, CAsEs AND MATERIALs ON CORPORATIoNs 794-98 (4th ed. unabr. 1969).
265 A. BROMBERG, supra note 264, at § 2.5(6).
266 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Movielab, Inc.
v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
267 Assuming the basic soundness of the concept of protecting investors through antifraud remedies, the degree of financial expertise possessed by some participants in the
commercial paper market should not deprive every investor of the overall availability of the
remedies under the federal securities acts. See cases cited note 266 supra; Lehigh Valley
Trust Co. v. Central Nat1 Bank, 409 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1217 (D. Md. 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
Professor Manne, however, has questioned many of the basic concepts involved. See H.
MANNE, supra note 214. But see W. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INsIDER TRADING
(1968).
268 E.g., Federal Securities Code §§ 216A, 301(n) & Comments 1-5 (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1972).
269 E.g., Schneider, Reform of the Federal Securities Laws, 115 U. PA. L. Ray. 1023
(1967).
270 E.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
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dence is that the swift evolution of the commercial paper market has
made a reshaping of the present regulatory structure essential to both
the continued maturation of the market and the effective protection of
the investor.
ADDENDUM
After this comment went to press, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held in Sanders v. Nuveen 271 that commercial paper-specifically, promissory notes with a maturity not exceeding nine months
that are offered to the public as an investment-is a "security" within
the definition of that term in section 8(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange

Act of

1934.272

Kenneth V. Handal
271 Nos. 71-1163, 71-1164 (7th Cir., June 9, 1972).
272 See also notes 53, 111, 238 supra.

